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Trade, Quality Upgrading and Wage Inequality




This paper proposes a new mechanism linking trade and wage inequality in developing
countries — the quality-upgrading mechanism — and investigates its empirical implications
in panel data on Mexican manufacturing plants. In a model with heterogeneous plants
and quality-diﬀerentiated goods, only the most productive plants in a country like Mexico
enter the export market, they produce higher-quality goods to appeal to richer Northern
consumers, and they pay high wages to attract and motivate a high-quality workforce. An
exchange-rate devaluation leads initially more-productive, higher-wage plants to increase
exports, upgrade quality, and raise wages relative to initially less-productive, lower-wage
plants within each industry. Using the late-1994 peso crisis as a source of variation and a
variety of proxies for plant productivity, I ﬁnd that initially more-productive plants increased
the export share of sales, white-collar wages, blue-collar wages, the relative wage of white-
collar workers, and ISO 9000 certiﬁcation more than initially less-productive plants during
the peso crisis period, and that these diﬀerential changes were greater than in periods
without devaluations before and after the crisis period. A factor-analytic strategy that
relies more heavily on the theoretical structure and avoids the need to construct proxies ﬁnds
similar results. These ﬁndings support the hypothesis that diﬀerential quality upgrading
induced by the exchange rate shock tended to increase within-industry wage inequality.
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1 Introduction
Beginning with a series of liberalizing reforms in 1985 and 1986, the Mexican economy ex-
perienced more than a decade of both rapidly expanding trade and rising wage inequality.
In current U.S. dollar terms, non-petroleum exports and total imports rose an average of
16.5% and 15.7% per year respectively over the 1985-2000 period. Figure 1 illustrates the
evolution of two measures of wage inequality: the log 90-10 ratio from a household employ-
ment survey, and the white-collar/blue-collar wage ratio from a balanced manufacturing
plant panel.1 Both illustrate a substantial increase, reaching a peak in 1996-1998. A sim-
ilar coincidence of expanding trade and rising inequality has been observed in many other
developing countries.2
From the perspective of standard Hecksher-Ohlin trade theory, this coincidence is puz-
zling. The simplest version of the Hecksher-Ohlin model predicts that wage inequality will
fall in a country like Mexico when it integrates with a country like the U.S., as production
shifts toward unskilled-labor-intensive industries, raising the demand for unskilled labor.
More sophisticated Hecksher-Ohlin-type models can account for a link between trade liber-
alization and wage inequality in a developing country like Mexico,3 but because such models
rely on between-sector shifts as the mechanism through which trade aﬀects labor markets,
they can only explain a rise in inequality if trade causes a shift in resources toward skilled-
labor-intensive sectors. Empirical studies have typically failed to ﬁnd evidence of such
shifts.4 Using aggregate data from the Mexican manufacturing censuses and schooling data
from a household survey, Figures 2 and 3 present evidence of shifts toward less-skill-intensive
and less-capital-intensive sectors within manufacturing in Mexico over the 1988-1998 period,
consistent with the simplest Hecksher-Ohlin model. It is common in the literature to inter-
pret increases in inequality that cannot be explained by between-sector shifts as evidence for
non-trade-related factors such as exogenous skill-biased technical change (Berman, Bound,
and Griliches, 1994; Berman, Bound, and Machin, 1998; Esquivel and Rodriguez-Lopez,
2003).
This paper proposes an alternative mechanism linking trade and wage inequality in de-
1The datasets are described in more detail in Section 4 and in Appendix B.
2See Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004, 2007) for reviews.
3Inequality may increase, for instance, if a unskilled-labor-abundant country Mexico opens trade simul-
taneously with a skill-abundant country like the U.S. and an even more unskilled-labor-abundant country
like China (Davis, 1996) or if relatively unskilled-labor-intensive industries are more protected prior to
liberalization (Revenga, 1997; Attanasio, Goldberg, and Pavcnik, 2004).
4Wacziarg and Seddon Wallack (2004) and Papageorgiou, Michaely, and Choksi (1991) ﬁnd little evidence
of shifts in response to trade liberalization in large samples of countries.
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veloping countries — the quality-upgrading mechanism — and investigates its empirical
implications in panel data on Mexican manufacturing plants. The theoretical framework
combines three main elements. First, plants are heterogeneous in productivity within in-
dustries and there is a ﬁxed cost to entering the export market, such that only the most
productive plants within each industry export, as in Melitz (2003). Second, goods are dif-
ferentiated in quality and consumers diﬀer in income and hence in willingness to pay for
product quality across countries, such that a given poor-country exporting plant produces
higher-quality goods for export than for the domestic market. Third, producing high-quality
goods is assumed to require high-quality workers within each occupational category, along
the lines of the O-ring models of Kremer (1993) and Kremer and Maskin (1996). In this
context, an increase in the incentive to export in a developing country generates diﬀerential
quality upgrading : initially more-productive plants increase exports, produce a greater share
of higher-quality goods, and raise wages relative to initially less-productive plants in the
same industry. Since initially more-productive plants also tend to be initially higher-wage,
this process tends to increase within-industry wage dispersion.
The empirical part of the paper uses the peso devaluation of December 1994, as well
as an earlier devaluation in 1985-86, to investigate this mechanism. I follow two separate
approaches to deal with the fact that a key variable in the model, the underlying produc-
tivity parameter, is unobserved. The ﬁrst approach uses observable variables to construct
simple proxies for this parameter; I refer to this approach as the proxy-variable strategy.
Using a number of diﬀerent proxies, I compare diﬀerential changes in outcomes between
initially more-productive and initially less-productive plants over the peso crisis period
(1993-1997) to corresponding changes in periods without devaluations before (1989-1993)
and after (1997-2001) the crisis period. I ﬁnd greater diﬀerential changes in the export share
of sales, white-collar wages, blue-collar wages, and the relative wage of white-collar workers
in the peso crisis period. The results for 1986-1989, also a period of real depreciation of
the peso, indicate patterns similar to those of 1993-1997. Using an auxiliary dataset, I ﬁnd
greater diﬀerential changes during the peso crisis period in the likelihood of ISO 9000 cer-
tiﬁcation, an international production standard commonly associated with product quality.
The basic results are not sensitive to the choice of proxy.
The second approach relies more heavily on the factor-analytic structure of the theo-
retical model and eliminates the need to construct proxies; I refer to it as the latent-factor
strategy. The model implies that a number of observable variables are functions of the same
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unobserved productivity parameter, and that the peso crisis changes the relationship be-
tween the observables and this latent factor without changing the distribution of the factor
itself. This implication is the basis for a maximum-likelihood estimation procedure that
integrates over the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity and estimates the param-
eters for all periods simultaneously. To avoid imposing strong distributional assumptions,
I follow Heckman and Singer (1984) in positing a non-parametric mass-point distribution
for the latent factor. The location and probability weights of the mass points are estimated
simultaneously with the other parameters. The results of this latent-factor approach are
consistent with those of the proxy-variable approach, as well as with the predictions of
the theoretical model. The results from both empirical strategies together support the hy-
pothesis that diﬀerential quality upgrading induced by the exchange-rate shock increased
within-industry wage inequality.
In addition to the work cited above, this paper is related to a number of diﬀerent strands
of existing literature. In introducing quality-diﬀerentiated goods and asymmetric countries
into a Melitz-type theoretical framework, it uses multinomial-logit microfoundations for
consumer demand (McFadden, 1981; Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse, 1992), because they
make transparent the dependence of willingness to pay for quality on consumer incomes.
The paper is related to a growing literature using plant-level data from developing countries
to examine plants’ responses to exposure to international markets; leading contributions to
this literature include Roberts and Tybout (1997); Currie and Harrison (1997); Clerides,
Lach, and Tybout (1998); Levinsohn (1999), and Pavcnik (2002). (For reviews, see Tybout
(2000, 2003).) The paper is related to work examining the role of product quality in
international trade, including Burenstam Linder (1961), Gabszewicz et al. (1982), Shaked
and Sutton (1982), Markusen (1986), Flam and Helpman (1987), Stokey (1991), Grossman
and Helpman (1991), Copeland and Kotwal (1996), Murphy and Shleifer (1997), Brooks
(2006), Hallak (2006), Hausmann et al. (2005), Hummels and Klenow (2005), and Schott
(2004).5 The paper is also related to a growing body of non-Hecksher-Ohlin models of trade
and wages, including Acemoglu (2003), Antras, Garicano, and Rossi-Hansberg (2006), and
Yeaple (2005). I am not aware of previous work that has focused on shifts in the within-plant
product mix between goods of diﬀerent qualities destined for diﬀerent markets. Previous
5This paper is also related to an older literature in radical political economy on labor market segmentation
(Edwards, 1979; Gordon, Edwards, and Reich, 1982). In the terminology of that literature, the argument
of this paper is that product market segmentation contributes to labor market segmentation within each
industry; the exchange rate shock exacerbates segmentation in product markets, which in turn exacerbates
segmentation in labor markets.
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studies that have used exchange-rate shocks as a source of identiﬁcation, in the context
of other research designs, include Revenga (1992), Abowd and Lemieux (1993), Maurin,
Thesmar, and Thoenig (2002) and Forbes (2002). The sheer size of the exchange-rate shock
— along with the fact that it was largely unexpected, unlike most trade agreements — may
explain why this paper ﬁnds stronger evidence of plant behavioral responses than is typical
in the literature using tariﬀ changes.6
An important caveat is that the particular mechanism this paper focuses on — within-
industry quality upgrading in response to a currency devaluation — cannot explain the
overall trend in Mexican wage inequality illustrated in Figure 1. There are many fac-
tors that may have contributed to changes in aggregate inequality, among them exogenous
technological change, migration (both internal and international), and other liberalization
policies that have accompanied the opening to trade. Figure 4 focuses more directly on
the dimension of wage inequality that this paper may be able to explain: wage dispersion
among manufacturing plants. The ﬁgure plots the variance of log average hourly wages
in a balanced manufacturing plant panel, as well as the variance of the residuals from a
regression of log average hourly wages on a full set of industry-year eﬀects.7 Total wage
dispersion rose sharply in 1994-1995 as well as in the period of the earlier devaluation,
1986-1987, and a non-negligible portion of the increase in variance can be attributed to an
increase in residual (within-industry) variance.8
The next section provides background on the peso crisis and presents a concrete example
— a case study of the Volkswagen plant in Puebla, Mexico — to illustrate the process of
quality upgrading. Section 3 develops the theoretical model. Section 4 describes the datasets
and presents descriptive statistics. Section 5 presents the proxy-variable strategy. Section
6 presents the latent-factor strategy. Section 7 addresses alternative explanations of those
results, and Section 8 concludes.
2 Background and Brief Case Study
For several years prior to the peso crisis, the Mexican government constrained the peso
to vary within a narrow band (±.0004 pesos/day from Oct. 1992 to Dec. 1994). Over
the same period, persistent trade and current-account deﬁcits led to mounting pressure on
6See Levinsohn (1999), Currie and Harrison (1997), Harrison and Hanson (1999) and Tybout (2003).
7The dataset is described in more detail in Section 4 below and in Appendix B.
8For further discussion of wage trends in Mexico, see Cragg and Epelbaum (1996), Hanson and Harrison
(1999), Hanson (2004), and Robertson (2004).
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government reserves. President Ernesto Zedillo took oﬃce on Dec. 1, 1994, and on Dec. 20
his new ﬁnance minister announced that the ceiling on the exchange-rate band would be
raised 15.6%, from 3.46 to 4.00 pesos/dollar. This set oﬀ a speculative attack, and two days
later the government was forced to allow the peso to ﬂoat. The peso devalued immediately
to 4.90 pesos/dollar, and continued losing value. Figure 5 plots the real exchange rate,
which reached a local maximum in March 1995 and recovered slowly thereafter. There
are a variety of theories about what generated the extra pressure on the currency that
prompted the government to devalue — a leading one points to a renewed oﬀensive of
Zapatista rebels in the Southern state of Chiapas (Economist Intelligence Unit, 1995) — but
whatever the precipitating event, it appears that the devaluation was largely unexpected.
Figure 6 presents monthly black market exchange rates9 and shows that both before and
after the crisis, and in particular on Dec. 1, 2004, the black market and oﬃcial exchange
rates coincided almost exactly.
The devaluation led to a major recession in Mexico, with GDP dropping by 6.2% (at
constant prices) from 1994 to 1995. Nominal wages remained roughly constant through
the crisis and labor costs for Mexican manufacturers fell in real peso or dollar terms. The
average wage for a male full-time worker with nine years of education fell from approximately
$1.50 per hour to approximately $.90 per hour from 1994 to 1995, rising back only to $1.10
per hour by 1999.10
It is worth emphasizing that the peso crisis was a much larger shock than the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which had taken eﬀect the previous January. By
1993, after eight years of liberalizing policies, almost all Mexican quotas and other non-tariﬀ
barriers had been removed, and approximately 95% of all imports into Mexico were covered
by tariﬀs of 20% or lower. On the U.S. side, approximately 80% of imports were covered
by tariﬀs of 5% or less. A majority of commodities were assigned phase-out schedules of
ﬁve or more years. Tariﬀ changes under NAFTA for the majority of commodities were thus
typically on the order of a few percent per year or less. A common view among observers
in Mexico is that NAFTA’s main role was as a commitment device to the general program
of liberalization begun in the 1980s, rather than as a marked change in trade costs.
How did the manufacturing sector respond to the peso crisis? Consider the example of
9The black market rates are from Global Financial Data (http://www.globalﬁnancialdata.com/) and are
based on monthly averages for wire transfers from New York to Mexico, as reported in Pick’s World Currency
Yearbook, as well as on operational rates of exchange used by the United Nations for personnel.
10These ﬁgures are from the Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano (ENEU) [National Urban Employment
Survey]. For details, refer to Appendix B.
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the Volkswagen automobile plant in Puebla, Mexico. The Puebla plant is the sole world
producer of the New Beetle and the sole North American producer of the Jetta. Until
July 2003, the plant also produced the Original Beetle, known in Mexico as the Sedan
(or, more aﬀectionately, the Vocho11), almost all of which were sold domestically. There
are clear quality diﬀerences between the Original Beetle and the newer models, the New
Beetle, Jetta, and Golf (a model from which the New Beetle borrows many components).
The New Beetle and the Jetta have automatic window-raising mechanisms; the windows
of the Original Beetle have to be cranked up by hand. The seats of the New Beetle and
Jetta consist of polyurethane foam; the seats of the Original Beetle are made partly of
lower-quality foam and partly of coconut ﬁbers, a cheaper substitute. These and other
diﬀerences are reﬂected in prices: in July 2003, the New Beetle was selling for US$17,750,
the Jetta for US$15,000, and the Original Beetle for US$7,500. Figure 7 illustrates the
eﬀect of the peso crisis on the plant’s product mix. Between 1994 and 1995, exports as a
share of total production rose sharply, due both to a decline in domestic sales and to an
increase in exports. The increase in the export share was accompanied by a sharp increase
in production of the higher-quality varieties as a share of output.
What consequences did this shift in product mix have inside the plant? A striking char-
acteristic of the plant, which I visited in May 2003, was the juxtaposition of the production
lines for the New Beetle and Jetta, which relied on state-of-the-art technology, and the
production line for the Original Beetle, which employed essentially the same technology
as when the plant opened in 1964, technology which had been in use in Germany since
the 1950s. In the welding area, for instance, the conveyor belt on the Original Beetle line
had been in continuous operation since 1967. The welding was done by hand, with sparks
ﬂying, and line-workers banged irregularities into shape with hammers. Under the same
roof, perhaps twenty yards away, the welding for the Jetta body was performed entirely by
robots; the labor requirements were limited to engineers to program the robots, and skilled
maintenance workers to repair the machines in case of mechanical failure. One consequence
of the shift in product mix, then,was a form of technological upgrading, an increase in the
production-weighted average level of technological sophistication in the plant. This change
occurred not because of an increase in the availability of new technologies, but because of
a greater reliance on technologies that were already in use in the plant.
As a consequence of the shift toward the high-quality varieties, demand appears to
11Vochito if you really want to sound Mexican.
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have fallen for frontline production workers (te´cnicos), who typically have a junior high
school (secundaria) education and whose starting wage in 2002 was US$11.18/day. De-
mand appears to have risen for the skilled blue-collar workers who maintain robots and
other automated machinery (especialistas), who are typically graduates of a 3-year post-
secundaria vocational school on the plant grounds and whose starting wage in 2002 was
US$18/day.12 I was unable to persuade the company to share detailed personnel data and
hence am not able to make deﬁnitive statements about the changing skill composition, but
conversations with both the former director of Human Resources and the president of the
Volkswagen union conﬁrm that the relative demand for especialistas rose with the shift in
the product mix. At the white-collar level, it appears that the use of software engineers on
the New Beetle and Jetta lines, highly skilled relative to the supervisors on the Original
Beetle line, increased as well.
Does the example of Volkswagen generalize to the manufacturing sector as a whole?
Figure 8 plots the export share of sales and the share of plants with positive exports for a
balanced panel over the 1993-2001 period;13 the shift toward exporting is evident.14 More
than 80% of Mexican exports over the period went to the U.S.; the increase in exports thus
largely represents an increase in sales on the U.S. market. Generalizing from the Volkswagen
example, it appears likely that the increase in exports to the U.S. was accompanied by
an increase in the average quality of goods produced and an upgrading of the industrial
workforce in exporting plants.
3 Theory
To provide a framework for the empirical analysis, this section develops a model that formal-
izes the quality-upgrading process as it played out at Volkswagen and, anecdotal evidence
suggests, across broad segments of the Mexican manufacturing sector. The model is partial-
equilibrium, focused on a single diﬀerentiated-goods industry assumed to be small relative
to the economy as a whole in either country. Also, not all of the key implications hold
for all parameter values; the model shows that there exist empirically plausible parameter
values for which the implications do hold. My hope is that these sacriﬁces of mathematical
elegance on one hand and realism on the other are justiﬁed by the extent to which the
12The source for the wage ﬁgures is the 2002-2004 Volkswagen-Puebla collective bargaining agreement.
13The dataset is described in more detail in Section 4 below and in Appendix B.
14It is a puzzle that the export share did not decline as the peso re-appreciated after the peso crisis, but
given this we would not expect the quality-upgrading process to have reversed itself in the 1997-2001 period.
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model achieves two goals: to bring the insights of new trade theory — which, in assuming
symmetric countries, has implicitly been focused on integration among developed countries
— to bear on the distinctive experience of developing countries; and to tie the model di-
rectly to an empirical approach capable of investigating its implications in data on Mexican
plants.15
3.1 Demand
There are two countries, North and South. In each market, indexed by d = n, s, there is a
mass Nd of statistically identical consumers, each of which is assumed to buy one unit of a
good from a continuum of goods indexed by ω and to have the indirect utility function:
V (ω) = θdq(ω)− p˜d(ω) + ε (1)
where q is product quality, assumed to be perfectly observable, and p˜ is price relative to
the price level in country d. The parameter θd captures the consumer’s willingness to pay
for quality. It can be interpreted as a function of income: given identical direct utility
functions, richer consumers have a lower marginal utility of income and are willing to pay
more for a given level of quality.16 I assume that θd is constant within a country but that
Northern consumers are more willing to pay for quality than Southern ones: θn > θs. I
treat θd as a ﬁxed parameter, and abstract from changes in consumers’ willingness to pay
for quality arising from income changes due to the peso crisis. It will be convenient to keep
track of prices relative to the price level in South, so let δd be the ratio of the price level in
country d to the price level in South; that is, δs = 1 and δn is the real exchange rate. The
price of good ω relative to the Southern price level is then pd(ω) = δdp˜d(ω).
The random consumer-product-match term, ε, is assumed to be independent and iden-
15The model is most closely related to that of Manasse and Turrini (2001), who also model heterogeneous
ﬁrms producing quality-diﬀerentiated goods and frame their results in terms of wage inequality. Three
features limit the usefulness of their model in this context: (1) it is not clear how to relate the utility
function of their representative consumer to the choices of individual consumers, and hence not clear how
to derive diﬀerences in aggregate quality demands from individual income diﬀerences; (2) product quality is
a deterministic function of ﬁxed ﬁrm characteristics, rather than a choice variable of the ﬁrm; and (3) each
ﬁrm employs only one employee and the employee receives all the rents from production, with the result
that it seems more natural to think of these individuals as entrepreneurs, and of dispersion of their payoﬀs
as dispersion in proﬁts rather than dispersion in wages.
16Following Tirole (2000, p. 97 fn 1), if consumers have direct utility U(ω) = u (κ) + q(ω) + eε where
κ is the consumption of a non-diﬀerentiated numeraire good, then optimization yields the indirect utility
function eV (ω) = u (yd − p˜d(ω)) + q(ω) + eε. If p˜d(ω) is small relative to the consumer’s income, yd, then
a ﬁrst-order expansion of the sub-utility function u (·) gives: eV (ω) = u (yd) − p˜d(ω)u′ (yd) + q(ω) + eε. Let
θd ≡ 1/u′ (yd) , V ≡ [eV /u′(yd)]− [u (yd) /u′ (yd)], ε ≡ eε/u′ (yd). We then have (1).
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tically distributed across consumer with a type 1 extreme-value distribution,17 as in a stan-
dard multinomial-logit model of consumer demand (McFadden, 1981; Anderson, de Palma,
and Thisse, 1992). A standard derivation yields the following expected demand for each




















where µ is a parameter of the distribution of ε that captures the degree of diﬀerentiation
between goods and Ωd is the set of goods available in consumer market d. I assume through-
out that plants are risk-neutral, and write demand without the expectation operator. Note
that this speciﬁcation of demand combines horizontal diﬀerentiation, in the sense that if the
prices of all goods are equal each will be purchased with positive probability, with vertical
diﬀerentiation, in sense that if the prices of all goods are equal higher-quality goods will be
purchased with higher probability.
3.2 Production
In each country, there is a continuum of potential entrepreneurs of mass 1, heterogeneous in
an exogenously ﬁxed productivity parameter λ, which can be interpreted as technical know-
how or entrepreneurial ability. To streamline the exposition, consider only the decisions of
Southern plants; the analysis for Northern plants is similar. It is convenient to think of a
plant that enters both the domestic and export markets as producing on diﬀerent production
lines, indexed by d = n, s.
I assume that each unit of output carries ﬁxed factor requirements: one white-collar
worker, one blue-collar worker, and one machine. Product quality is assumed to depend
on the “quality” of the two workers, the technical sophistication of the machine, and the
ability of the entrepreneur, combining in Cobb-Douglas fashion:18
qd(kd, ehd , e
h

















, where γ = .5772 (Euler’s constant) by assumption to ensure
that the expectation of ε is zero.
18This function can be interpreted as a reduced-form relationship between factor inputs and resulting
product quality. It may arise, for instance, because producing high quality requires sophisticated machinery
or other capital, which in turn requires high quality workers.
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where k represents the amount of capital embodied in the machine, and eh and el represent
the quality of the white-collar and blue-collar worker, respectively.19 As in the O-ring
production functions of Kremer (1993) and Kremer and Maskin (1996), which this function
emulates, many low-skilled workers cannot substitute for one high-skilled one, and the
qualities of diﬀerent workers are strongly complementary.20 Let α ≡ αk+αh+αl and assume
that improvements to product quality from a given increase in the skill and sophistication
of inputs are diminishing: α < 1. This will ensure an interior solution in the choice of
product quality.
Plants face a worker quality-wage schedule that is assumed to be upward-sloping and,



















where whd and w
l
d are the wages of white-collar and blue-collar workers on a particular
production line and zh and zl are positive constants. The variables wh and wl represent the
average wages of white-collar and blue-collar workers in the outside labor market, and are
taken to be exogenous.21 These worker quality-wage schedules can be justiﬁed on the basis
of a number of diﬀerent models: a model in which worker quality represents general skill,
workers are heterogeneous in skill levels within each occupational category, and plants must
pay high wages to attract high-skill workers, as in Kremer (1993); a model in which worker
quality represents eﬀort and plants must oﬀer eﬃciency wages in order to induce workers to
supply it (Akerlof, 1982; Bowles, 1985; Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984);22 or a model in which
worker quality represents plant-speciﬁc skills and workers bargain for a share of the gains
to investments in those skills (Hashimoto, 1981). For present purposes, the important point
19It is valid to interpret (3) as indicating that product quality is skill-intensive, as long as it is understood
that this means intensive in worker skill or eﬀort for given factor shares of employment, rather than a high
white-collar share of employment.
20The ideal experiment to test the assumption that high-quality products require high-quality workers
would randomly assign quality requirements to diﬀerent plants, and then examine how plants adjust skill
levels, skill shares, wages and technology. Although the assumption is the basis for a parsimonious account
of a number of patterns presented in the empirical part of this paper, in the absence of such an experiment
the ultimate validation of the assumption will depend on how well the model predicts out of sample, and
hence must await future empirical work. For evidence on the related point that the production of newly
invented goods requires highly skilled workers, see Xiang (2005).
21The model is thus implicitly focused on a single industry that is small relative to the economy as a
whole. The task of making the model general-equilibrium and endogenizing the economy-wide wage level is
left to future work.
22Dalmazzo (2002) integrates this eﬃciency-wage idea explicitly into the model of Kremer (1993).
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is that worker quality improves product quality and is costly to the plant to acquire.23
The rental cost of capital is ρ. I assume that there are ﬁxed costs fd to entering each
market and that a plant must enter the domestic market before entering the export market.
The combination of constant marginal cost and the ﬁxed cost of entry generates increasing
returns to scale. There is no cost to diﬀerentiation and plants are constrained to oﬀer just
one variety. As a consequence, all plants diﬀerentiate and have a monopoly in the market
for their particular variety.
3.3 Plants’ Optimization
Each plant chooses the white-collar wage, the blue collar wage, capital intensity (which
together determine quality) and prices to maximize proﬁts, separately for each production
line. As is standard in monopolistic competition models, I assume that each plant thinks
of itself as small relative to the market as a whole, and treats the denominator in (2) as








wh∗d (λ) = w
h + αhδdθdq∗d(λ) (5b)
wl∗d (λ) = w







p∗d(λ) = µδd + w













where η ≡ (zhαh)αh (zlαl)αl (αkr )αk is a constant.
These equations carry several implications. First, all else equal, higher-λ plants produce
higher-quality goods, pay higher wages to both white-collar and blue-collar workers, are
more capital-intensive, charge higher prices produce more output, and are more proﬁtable
than lower-λ plants.
Second, if a plant enters both markets, then it chooses greater quality, prices, wages
and capital intensity for goods sold in North than for goods sold in South, since θn > θs.
The model can thus account for plants “shipping the good apples out” (Alchian and Allen,
23The implications of the three interpretations are examined in matched employer-employee data in Kaplan
and Verhoogen (2006).
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1964; Hummels and Skiba, 2004) even in the absence of a per-unit transport cost.
Third, all else equal, plant size and wages are positively correlated, since both are
increasing in λ. The model thus provides a natural explanation for the employer size-wage
eﬀect, documented by Brown and Medoﬀ (1989) and others.
Fourth, all else equal, both prices and quality are positively correlated with plant size,
since all are increasing in λ. This feature is not present in Melitz (2003), which predicts
either that prices are decreasing and quality is constant in productivity (and hence plant
size), or, in an alternative formulation, that quality is increasing and prices are constant in
productivity (and hence plant size) (Melitz, 2003, p. 1699).
Fifth, whether the ratio of the white-collar wage to the blue-collar wage is increasing or
decreasing in quality, and hence in λ and θd, depends on the sensitivity of product quality
to the quality of each type of worker in (3). If product quality is more sensitive to the skill
of white-collar workers, as conjectured by Kremer and Maskin (1996), then the wage ratio
may be increasing in both λ and θd.24
Finally, the fact that proﬁtability is increasing in λ implies that in equilibrium there
will be a cut-oﬀ value for each destination, λmind , above which all plants will enter and earn
positive proﬁts, and below which no plants will enter. The cut-oﬀ is determined by the
condition that the marginal plant have zero proﬁts after paying the ﬁxed cost of entry to
the destination market.
3.4 Observable Variables
In practice it is rare to have data by production line within plants. In the Mexican data,
we observe variables at the plant level; these can be thought of as weighted averages of the
values of each production line, with the weights given by the export share of output. The
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observable variables are:
wh = χwhn + (1− χ)whs (6a)
wl = χwln + (1− χ)wls (6b)
k = χkn + (1− χ) ks (6c)
q = χqn + (1− χ) qs (6d)
Eh = El = xs + xn (6e)
rn = pnxn (6f)





where E is employment (of white-collar or blue-collar workers), r is revenues, ν is the export
share of revenues, and χs ≡ xnxn+xs is the export share of output.
Figure 9 summarizes the cross-sectional relationship between quality and λ. The dotted
q∗ (λ) curve represents average quality if all plants were to enter both markets, a weighted
average of quality on the domestic production line, q∗s(λ), and quality on the export pro-
duction line, q∗n(λ), with the weights given by the export share of output of each plant. This
curve is steeper than qs(λ), both because qn(λ) is steeper than qs(λ) (since θn > θs in (5a)),
and because the export share of output is increasing in λ.25 Only plants above λminn in fact
enter the export market; the solid curve represents actual average quality as a function of
λ, taking into account entry patterns.
As equations (5a)-(5d) indicate, the model predicts cross-sectional patterns similar to
that of the solid curve for observed white-collar wages, blue-collar wages, and capital in-
tensity. If product quality is suﬃciently more sensitive to the quality of white-collar than
blue-collar workers, then we would also expect the wage ratio to follow a similar pattern.
3.5 Discussion of Eﬀects of Exchange-Rate Devaluation
In the context of this model, we can think of the devaluation and the ensuing recession as
having two eﬀects: an increase in the real exchange rate, δn, and a decline in the number
of domestic consumers, Ns. I assume that the Northern economy is large relative to the
Southern one, such that increased entry of Southern plants into the Northern market has
a negligible eﬀect on the proﬁtability of other plants selling in North. The net eﬀect of
25See A.7 in Appendix A.2.
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the exchange-rate shock on Southern plants’ entry into the export market is clear: λminn
falls. The net eﬀect on entry of Southern plants into the Southern market is ambiguous:
on one hand, the devaluation makes Southern plants more competitive; on the other hand,
domestic demand contracts. (Appendix A.1 demonstrates these results formally.)
Figure 10 illustrates the eﬀect of the peso crisis on product quality. Quality on the
domestic production line, qs(λ) does not depend on either δn or Ns and hence is unaﬀected
by the exchange-rate shock.26 Quality on the export line, qn(λ), increases for all values of λ
and to a greater extent for larger values of λ. Appendix A.2 shows that under the condition
χ < 1/2, empirically realistic since on average even among exporters exports make up less
than half of sales, the export share of output also increases for all values of λ and to a greater
extent for larger values of λ. Hence the dotted average quality line, q∗(λ), shifts up with
the crisis, both because the qn(λ) curve shifts up and because the export share of output
increases. The cut-oﬀ of entry to the export market shifts to the left. As noted above, the
direction of movement of the cut-oﬀ for entry into the domestic market is ambiguous. The
ﬁgure illustrates the case in which the demand contraction dominates, which appears to be
the empirically relevant one; bankruptcies rose sharply during the crisis.
Figure 11 depicts the diﬀerence between the two solid lines in Figure 10, the change in
observable quality taking into account entry patterns. The plants that switch into export-
ing (between λminn
′ and λminn ) see an especially large increase in average quality. Average
quality is increasing in λ within the category of switchers and within the category of always
exporters (to the right of λminn ). As suggested by equations (5a)-(5e), the model predicts
a similar pattern for white-collar wages, blue-collar wages and capital intensity. If product
quality is suﬃciently more sensitive to the quality of white-collar than blue-collar workers
(refer to footnote 24, then the wage ratio will follow a similar pattern. By assumption,
there is no such prediction for the white-collar share of employment.
4 Data
The results in this paper are primarily based on the Encuesta Industrial Anual (EIA)
[Annual Industrial Survey], a yearly panel survey conducted by the Instituto Nacional de
Estad´ısticas, Geograf´ıa, e Informacio´n (INEGI), the Mexican government statistical agency.
26The peso crisis reduced real incomes of Mexican consumers. If we allowed this negative income shock
to reduce consumers’ willingness to pay for quality, as found by McKenzie (2006), then we would expect the
qss (λ) curve to shift down in response to the crisis, which would tend to accentuate the diﬀerential responses
of low-λ and high-λ plants.
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The EIA is based on a deterministic sample of the largest plants in 205 of the 309 6-digit
manufacturing industries in the Mexican industrial classiﬁcation system. The EIA survey
excludes maquiladoras, assembly plants that participate in a Mexican government export-
promotion program.27 I constructed two balanced panels from the EIA: the EIA 1993-2001
Panel, which contains 3,263 plants; and the EIA 1984-2001 Panel, which contains fewer
plants — 1,114 — but over a longer period.28
INEGI carried out a more qualitative plant survey, the Encuesta Nacional de Empleo,
Salarios, Tecnolog´ıa y Capacitac´ıon (ENESTyC) [National Survey of Employment, Wages,
Technology and Training] in 1992, 1995, 1999 and 2001, with questions referring to the
previous year. In 1995, 1999 and 2001 the ENESTyC elicited information on ISO 9000
certiﬁcation, an international production standard. While ISO 9000 is mainly a procedural
standard, the common view among Mexican managers is that ISO 9000 is a signal of high
product quality, and I will take it as such for the purposes of this paper.29 I refer to the
844 plants that appear in both the EIA and the ENESTyC and that have data on ISO 9000
certiﬁcation in 1995, 1999 and 2001 as the EIA-ENESTyC panel.
Details on the processing of these data as well as of the other datasets used in this pa-
per, including the Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano (ENEU) [National Urban Employ-
ment Survey] and the Estad´ısticas Mensuales de la Industria Maquiladora de Exportacio´n
(EMIME) [Monthly Statistics on Maquiladora Export Industry], are in Appendix B.
Panel A of Table 1 reports summary statistics for the EIA 1993-2001 Panel for the initial
year, 1993, separately by export status.30 As observed by Bernard and Jensen (1999) in U.S.
data, there are systematic diﬀerences between exporters and non-exporters in cross-section:
exporters are larger in terms of employment and total sales; are more capital-intensive;
and pay higher wages, especially to white-collar workers. They also have greater domestic
sales. Panel B of Table 1 reports means by export status for relevant variables from the
EIA-ENESTyC Panel. We see further that exporters are more likely to have ISO 9000
certiﬁcation, hire white-collar and blue-collar workers with more years of schooling, and
27In Mexico, the participants in this program are referred to as maquiladoras de exportacio´n (exporting
maquiladoras). The word maquiladora is used more generally to apply to any plant producing under sub-
contract. I use the term only to refer to the former group.
28I also constructed an unbalanced panel for the 1993-2001 period, which I refer to as the EIA 1993-2001
Unbalanced Panel; refer to footnote 42 and the data construction details in Appendix B.
29ISO 9000 certiﬁcation is not cheap talk. Obtaining certiﬁcation typically takes between nine months
and two years and costs $187,000 (1996 U.S. dollars) on average (Guler, Guillen, and Macpherson, 2002).
30The EIA 1984-2001 Panel contains a greater share of large plants than the EIA 1993-2001 Panel but the
qualitative diﬀerences between non-exporters and exporters are similar to those reported here.
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have lower rates of absenteeism, accidents and turnover.31
5 Proxy-Variable Strategy
5.1 Econometric Model
The main implication of the theoretical model is that the pattern illustrated by Figure 11
should hold for a number observable variables — export share, white-collar wage, blue-
collar wage, capital intensity, and ISO 9000 certiﬁcation — to a greater extent during the
peso crisis period than in other periods without an exchange-rate devaluation. A central
econometric challenge in testing this implications is that the key variable, entrepreneurial
ability λ, is unobserved. This section presents an econometric strategy that uses simple
observable proxies for this parameter, λ. Section 6 below uses an alternative strategy that
avoids the need for proxies.
The theoretical model suggests a number of variables that are correlated with λ in cross-
section and hence that are candidates to be proxies. My preferred proxy is log domestic
sales, deviated from industry means. The main argument for this proxy is that sales is
the only variable that is observed separately by production line. In cross-section, domestic
sales thus bears a smooth, continuous relationship to λ, without the discontinuity at the
cut-oﬀ for entry into the export market. The domestic sales variable has the additional
advantage that it is relatively well measured. I present results for a variety of alternative
proxies below.
The discontinuous, non-linear function depicted in Figure 11 is unlikely to hold em-
pirically, both because of the noise in domestic sales (and the other proxies) and because
the costs of entering the export market are likely to be heterogeneous across plants and
industries. Rather than attempting to estimate that curve, I approximate it with a linear
function. In the absence of background trends between higher-λ and lower-λ plants, we
would expect a positively sloped line during the peso-crisis period and a horizontal line
in other periods. In practice such background trends are likely to exist, however, so the
testable prediction is that the slope of changes in the observable variables — export share,
white-collar wage, blue-collar wage, capital intensity, and product quality — against λ will
be greater in periods with major devaluations than in periods without.
31These diﬀerences are signiﬁcant at the 5% level for training, white-collar schooling, and absentee rate,
but not for ISO 9000 certiﬁcation, blue-collar schooling, the accident rate or the turnover rate.
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The main estimating equation is the following:
yijr = α + λ˜ijrβ + δj + ξr + uijr (7)
where i, j and r index plants, industries and states, respectively; yijr is a change in
one of the outcome variables; α is an intercept term; λ˜ijr is the value of entrepreneurial-
ability proxy in the initial year; δj is an industry ﬁxed eﬀect; ξr is a state ﬁxed eﬀect;
and uijr is a mean-zero disturbance. I estimate this equation separately by period and
compare the coeﬃcient estimates β̂ across periods. When using the EIA 1993-2001 Panel,
I estimate for the periods 1993-1997 and 1997-2001. When using the EIA 1984-2001 Panel
(for which exports are available beginning in 1986), I use the periods 1986-1989, 1989-1993,
1993-1997, and 1997-2001. The theoretical predictions are that β̂1993−1997 > β̂1997−2001,
β̂1993−1997 > β̂1989−1993, and β̂1986−1989 > β̂1989−1993 when the dependent variable is the
change in the export share, white-collar wage, blue-collar wage, capital intensity or ISO
9000 certiﬁcation. Note that if there were just two groups of plants, high-λ˜ and low-λ˜, then
this strategy would amount to a familiar triple-diﬀerences strategy: β̂1993−1997 would reﬂect
the diﬀerence in diﬀerences between high-λ˜ and low-λ˜ plants from 1993 to 1997, β̂1997−2001
the diﬀerence in diﬀerences from 1997 to 2001, and β̂1993−1997 − β̂1997−2001 the diﬀerence in
diﬀerence in diﬀerences.
The analogy with triple-diﬀerence designs highlights a potential pitfall in the estimation.
If we use information from many years of pre- or post-crisis data without taking into account
serial correlation across periods, then we may overstate the amount of independent variation
in the pre-treatment and post-treatment periods and understate the standard errors on
the coeﬃcient estimates, as discussed by Bertrand, Duﬂo, and Mullainathan (2004). My
strategy is to select just one year of data pre-crisis and one year post-crisis, i.e. 1993 and
1997 for the peso crisis period, 1997 and 2001 for the placebo period without an exchange-
rate shock.32 Bertrand, Duﬂo, and Mullainathan (2004) refer to this strategy as “ignoring
time-series information” and ﬁnd that it performs reasonably well in a Monte Carlo study.33
A potential concern with regression (7) when the change in export share appears on
the left-hand side and initial log domestic sales on the right is that domestic sales appears
in the denominator of the export share in the initial period and hence any measurement
32I have examined the robustness of the results to the choice of beginning and end years. The basic results
are not sensitive to these choices.
33I have varied the years used as initial and ﬁnal years of each period; the basic results are insensitive to
these changes.
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error in domestic sales will generate a mechanical positive bias in the estimate of β. Under
the assumption that the measurement error in domestic sales is uncorrelated over time,
an IV strategy instrumenting log domestic sales with its lag will correct this bias.34 A
disadvantage of this IV strategy is that it requires two years of pre-devaluation data. In the
case of the EIA 1993-2001 Panel, this means using 1993 as the lagged value and looking at
changes over the 1994-1997 period. It may be that in 1994 plants were already responding
to NAFTA, which had been implemented at the beginning of the year. For this reason, I
present both the OLS and the IV results below.
It is important to consider the possibility that plants are characterized by time-varying
productivity shocks in addition to the time-invariant productivity represented by λ. It may
be that the productivity shocks are correlated with λ if, for instance, new technologies peri-
odically become available to all plants but more technologically advanced plants are better
able to adopt the new technology. If so, and if the productivity shocks also aﬀect the de-
pendent variable, y, then the OLS estimate of β will be inconsistent. This problem is not
addressed by instrumenting with lagged domestic sales. Note, however, that as long as the
distribution of the productivity shocks and the eﬀect of the shocks on the dependent variable
are constant over time, then the diﬀerence in OLS coeﬃcients (e.g. β̂1993−1997− β̂1997−2001)
will be consistent. This underlines the need to have a “control” period without a devalu-
ation against which to compare the “treatment” period of the peso crisis. The treatment
period-control period comparison can diﬀerence out any such diﬀerential background trends
between higher- and lower-λ plants.35
5.2 Results
Let us begin with a set of graphs that illustrate the main results. Figures 12a-d plot
non-parametric regressions of the levels of the export share, log white-collar wages, log
blue-collar wages, and the log wage ratio in pre- and post-crisis years against log domestic
sales in 1993. The dark, bold curves are for the pre-crisis year, the gray curves for the post-
crisis year. All variables have been deviated from year-speciﬁc industry means. Figure 12a
34The assumption that the measurement error in domestic sales is uncorrelated over time is admittedly
quite strong, and for this reason the IV results should be treated with caution.
35A related point is that caution is warranted in drawing causal inferences from regressions of, for instance,
changes in wages on changes in the export share or in other measures of export status, as in Bernard and
Jensen (1997) or Bustos (2005). The theoretical model suggests that a positive productivity shock will
generate both an increase in exports and an increase in wages, giving rise to a positive omitted-variables
bias in the coeﬃcient on the change in exports.
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illustrates that the diﬀerence in export share between 199436 and 1997 is larger for plants
with higher domestic sales in 1993.37 Figures 12b-d illustrate both that log white-collar
wages, log blue-collar wages, and the log wage ratio are increasing in cross-section, and
also that initially higher-domestic-sales plants saw greater increases in these wage variables
than initially lower-domestic-sales plants over the period. It is also worth emphasizing that
these ﬁgures do not impose linearity; the fact that they are approximately linear suggests
that the linearization of the model reﬂected in (7) is not an unreasonable approximation, at
least for the observable wage variables that are the outcomes of primary interest. Figures
13a-d compare changes in our key variables over 1993-1997 period (dark, bold curves) to
changes over the 1997-2001 period (gray curves), using deviated log domestic sales in the
initial years (1993 and 1997) on the x-axes. The changes over the 1993-1997 period are
visibly larger for higher-λ plants for all three wage variables, log white-collar wages, log
blue-collar wages, and the log wage ratio.
To get a better sense of the statistical signiﬁcance of these patterns, we now turn to
the regression results. Panel A of Table 2 reports cross-sectional regressions of six diﬀerent
outcome variables on log domestic sales in 1993 (and industry and region eﬀects), using
plants in the EIA 1993-2001 Panel. As expected, white-collar wages, blue-collar wages and
capital intensity are positively correlated with the λ proxy within industries. The coeﬃcient
in the export share equation is negative, but this appears to be due to a mechanical bias
generated by measurement error in domestic sales, negative in this case; when log domestic
sales in 1994 is instrumented with its lag, the coeﬃcient is .005 and signiﬁcant at the 5%
level.38
Panel B of Table 2 reports estimates of (7) for the same six diﬀerent outcome variables,
estimated separately for 1993-1997 and 1997-2001. In the OLS results, that the coeﬃcient
on log domestic sales is signiﬁcantly larger in 1993-1997 than in 1997-2001 for the export
share, white-collar wages, blue-collar wages, the wage ratio, and capital intensity. The
magnitudes indicate economically signiﬁcant eﬀects. Consider two plants, one of which
is 10% larger in log domestic sales terms than the other. Column 2 indicates that the
36I use 1994 as the pre-crisis year for the export share to avoid the mechanical negative bias in the
relationship between the export share in 1993 and domestic sales in 1993.
37The high values of export shares at low values of log domestic sales on both curves are due to a small
number of plants that appear to be maquiladoras, that were included in the EIA dataset by mistake, and
that my cleaning procedures failed to ﬁlter out (see Appendix B).
38Non-parametric cross-sectional regressions of these outcome variables against log domestic sales (devi-
ated from industry means) suggest that the assumption of linearity in (7) is not unreasonable, at least for
the observable wage variables that are the outcomes of primary interest. See Figures 12-13.
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larger plant had an approximately .7% greater wage increase for white-collar workers than
the smaller plant during the 1993-1997 period, and a .16% greater increase during 1997-
2001. It is notable that there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in diﬀerential changes in the log
wage ratio of white-collar to blue-collar workers. This is consistent with the conjecture of
Kremer and Maskin (1996) that product quality is more sensitive to the skill of managerial
workers. There is no evidence of diﬀerential trends in the ratio of white-collar hours to total
hours; the coeﬃcients are precisely estimated and essentially zero in both periods. The IV
estimates, instrumenting initial log domestic sales with its lag, are of smaller magnitude
than the OLS estimates, in part a consequence of the fact that the dependent variables are
changes over a shorter period,39 but the diﬀerences in slopes between the two periods for
the wage variables and capital intensity are robust.
Table 3 presents OLS results for the EIA 1984-2001 Panel, which allows us to look before
the peso crisis period as well as after. As was illustrated by Figure 5, the peso depreciated
sharply in 1985-1986 and subsequently re-appreciated over the 1987-1993 period. Although
the aggregate export response to the 1985-1986 devaluation was smaller than to the peso
crisis, we would nonetheless expect to see greater diﬀerential trends between higher- and
lower-λ plants in the 1986-1989 and 1993-1997 periods than in the 1989-1993 period. The
coeﬃcients in the export share equations are just marginally distinguishable, and there
is an anomalous result for capital intensity, but the important message of the table is
that for the wage outcomes the earlier devaluation period (1986-1989) resembles the peso-
crisis period (1993-1997), and the 1989-1993 period of re-appreciation resembles the post-
crisis re-appreciation period (1997-2001). This particular time pattern of changes points to
exchange-rate movements as a driving force of the diﬀerential wage changes.
Table 4 presents results for additional variables available only in the EIA-ENESTyC
panel. Panel A presents cross-sectional linear regressions similar to those of Panel A of
Table 2 for variables from the ENESTyC survey. There is strong evidence of cross-sectional
correlation between log domestic sales and indicators that are plausibly associated with
high-quality production. Controlling for industry and region eﬀects, larger plants are sig-
niﬁcantly more likely to have ISO 9000 certiﬁcation, to have a formal training program,
to employ white-collar and blue-collar workers with higher average schooling, and to have
lower turnover, accident, and the absentee rates. Panel B reports estimates of (7) for these
outcome variables. For ISO 9000 certiﬁcation there is strong evidence of diﬀerential trends
39In the case of the export share, the IV procedure also removes the mechanical positive bias arising from
the fact that domestic sales appears in the denominator.
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between initially smaller and initially larger plants, and the diﬀerence in diﬀerential trends
across periods is marginally signiﬁcant. There is also evidence of a greater diﬀerential in-
crease in the average schooling of blue-collar workers in the earlier period.40 There is no
strong evidence of diﬀerential changes in the other variables. One interpretation of these re-
sults is that quality upgrading requires changing the composition of the blue-collar workforce
but not other workplace practices. Another plausible explanation, however, is simply that
the other workplace-practice variables are too poorly measured to pick up subtle changes in
plant behavior. The results using the ENESTyC variables should be treated with caution
— ISO 9000 is not an ideal measure of product quality, sample sizes are relatively small,
and the intervals between waves of the ENESTyC are of diﬀerent lengths, among other rea-
sons — but the cross-sectional patterns and the diﬀerence in diﬀerential trends in ISO 9000
certiﬁcation and blue-collar schooling are corroborative evidence for the quality-upgrading
hypothesis.
While the domestic sales proxy has much to recommend it, it can be criticized on the
grounds that plant size may reﬂect a number of factors that are unrelated to entrepreneurial
ability or productivity. Table 5 reports estimates of (7) for the export share, white-collar
wages, blue-collar wages and the wage ratio using a variety of alternative proxies that theory
predicts will be correlated with λ: log employment; predicted export share; predicted ISO
9000 certiﬁcation; the ﬁrst principal component of a number of variables hypothesized to
be correlated with λ; total factor productivity; log domestic sales per worker; and actual
export share. Details on the construction of each of these proxies are in Appendix B.6. Un-
surprisingly, they tend to be highly correlated within industries; Appendix Table 1 reports
bivariate correlations among them. The results for the export share, white-collar wages and
blue-collar wages are generally quite robust to the choice of proxy: the diﬀerence in coeﬃ-
cients is at least marginally signiﬁcant in all but one case.41 The results for the wage ratio
are somewhat less robust, but are generally consistent with those using the domestic-sales
proxy in Table 2.42
40It is worth emphasizing, however, that the schooling measures are based on managers’ estimates of the
number of workers in broad schooling categories, and are likely to be quite noisy.
41Note that in any given year more than half of plants have zero exports, and the actual export share
proxy only varies among the initially exporting plants. This may explain the non-robustness of the estimate
for white-collar wages when using actual export share as the λ proxy.
42Using an unbalanced panel from the EIA for 1993-2001, I have also estimated a Heckman selection-
correction model to correct for endogenous exit (Heckman, 1976); see Appendix Table 2. The model is
identiﬁed on the basis of functional form assumptions, rather than an excluded instrument, and the estimates
should be treated with caution, but it is nonetheless reassuring that they correspond closely to the results




Despite the fact that the results from the proxy-variable strategy appear to be robust to the
choice of proxy, one might argue that all proxies are indirectly picking up the eﬀects of size
or other factors that are unrelated to the notion of entrepreneurial ability that underpins
the theoretical model. In addition, one might object that any one proxy on its own does
not make eﬃcient use of the available data. This section takes an alternative approach to
the problem of unobservability of the productivity parameter. It uses the factor-analytic
structure of the theoretical model to estimate the parameters relating productivity and
the observable variables for all period simultaneously by maximum likelihood, without the
ﬁrst-step construction of proxies.
As in the proxy-variable strategy, I take a linearized version of the theoretical model.
Appendix A.3 shows that a ﬁrst-order approximation of the equations for the observable
variables, (6a)-(6h), yields the following:43
νijt = a1,jt + b1,tλ˜ij + ε1,ijt (8a)
whijt = a2,jt + b2,tλ˜ij + ε2,ijt (8b)
wlijt = a3,jt + b3,tλ˜ij + ε3,ijt (8c)
kijt = a4,jt + b4,tλ˜ij + ε4,ijt (8d)
qijt = a5,jt + b5,tλ˜ij + ε7,ijt (8e)
Ehijt = a6,jt + b6,tλ˜ij + ε5,ijt (8f)
Elijt = a7,jt + b7,tλ˜ij + ε6,ijt (8g)
rs,ijt = a8,jt + b8,tλ˜ij + ε8,ijt (8h)
where i, j and t index plants, industries and periods; λ˜ij is productivity deviated from
industry means (that is, λ˜ij ≡ λij − λj , where λj is the mean for industry j); and the
dependent variables are deﬁned as above, with wages, the capital-labor ratio, employment
(hours) and revenues measured in logs. The slope terms bm,t for m = 1, 2, ..., 8 are assumed
43The linearization is complicated by the fact that the export share is discontinuous at the cut-oﬀ value for
entry into the export market, λminn . My approach is to simplify the problem by treating the export share of
output as a diﬀerentiable function of λ. One interpretation of this is that the export share is observed with
error, for the reasons discussed in footnote 52 below, and noise should be added to the non-diﬀerentiable
curve in Figure 11. The non-parametric regressions in Figure 12 suggest that the linearization is not wildly
inappropriate, at least for the wage variables that are of primary interest.
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to be constant across industries within a given year but to vary across years. Note that
each of the equations (8a)-(8h) is a restatement of (7) in levels rather than changes.44 The
coeﬃcient β in (7) in, for instance, the peso-crisis period corresponds here to a diﬀerence
in slope coeﬃcients between 1993 and 1997, bm,1997 − bm,1993. In the context of (8a)-(8h),
the predictions of the theoretical model are (refer to Appendix A.3):
bm,t > 0 ∀m, t (9a)
(bm,1997 − bm,1993)− (bm,2001 − bm,1997) > 0 for m = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 (9b)
Equations (8a)-(8h) make clear that the model has a factor-analytic structure, with a
form similar to the “multiple indicator” models of Jo¨reskog and Goldberger (1975). In
a given period, the observable variables are all functions of the same unobserved factor,
λ˜ij . The peso devaluation is hypothesized to aﬀect the slope of each dependent variable
with respect to the unobserved factor, but the unobserved factor itself is ﬁxed over time.
If one knew the distribution of the entrepreneurial-ability term, one could integrate over
that distribution and estimate all of the parameters, am,jt, bm,t ∀ m, j, t, simultaneously
by maximum likelihood. In this approach, one would prefer to avoid making strong as-
sumptions about the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity, since one would have no
theoretical justiﬁcation for the choice. Here I follow Heckman and Singer (1984) in approx-
imating the distribution of underlying heterogeneity non-parametrically using a discrete
mass-point distribution. The number, height and length of the steps of the step-function
cdf are estimated simultaneously with the other model parameters in the maximum likeli-
hood procedure. The resulting semi-parametric estimator is related to estimators used by
Keane, Moﬃtt, and Runkle (1988) and Clerides, Lach, and Tybout (1998).45
This latent-factor strategy is not costless: to estimate the model I must impose distribu-
tional assumptions on the idiosyncratic errors, εk,ijt. In particular, I assume that the error
terms have a multivariate normal distribution and are uncorrelated across equations and
years. That is, setting εijt ≡ (ε1,ijt ε2,ijt ε3,ijt ε4,ijt ε5,ijt ε6,ijt ε7,ijt ε8,ijt)′, the assumption
is:
εijt|λ˜ij , j, t ∼ N (0, Q) (10)
44In this section, I omit the region eﬀects.
45Mroz (1999) presents a valuable exposition of the discrete-approximation approach. Bigsten et al. (2004)
apply the method in investigating learning-by-exporting among African plants.
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where Q is a diagonal matrix with diagonal elements {σ2m}, for m = 1, 2, ..., 8. The ﬂexibility
that is gained in the speciﬁcation of the distribution of the underlying factor is important
compensation for this cost, however.












, a vector of the dependent variables
in (8a)-(8h). Let b be a vector of the 8∗T coeﬃcients of interest, bm,t, and let a be a vector
of the industry-year speciﬁc intercepts, ajt. The likelihood conditional on λ˜ij is:

















where J is the total number of industries, Ij is number of plants in industry j, T is the
total number of periods, and ϕ(·) is the standard normal pdf.
It is not feasible to maximize (11), since λ˜ij is not known. Assuming that the underlying
heterogeneity has a discrete distribution with V points of support, the likelihood becomes
a summation over V conditional likelihood functions:
























where τv is the probability corresponding to the vth mass-point λ˜v. The τv and the λ˜v for
v = 1, 2, ..., V can then be estimated simultaneously with the vectors of coeﬃcients, a , and
b. The Monte Carlo study by Mroz (1999) for a simpler model suggests that this method
performs well under a variety of assumptions, and avoids the errors of inference that would
arise from imposing an incorrect distribution on the underlying heterogeneity.
A number of practical issues must be addressed in the estimation. First, the coeﬃcients
bm,t are not identiﬁed separately from the scale of the latent factor, λ˜, and normalizations
have to be imposed. I normalize the discrete factor such that λ˜v−λ˜v = 1 and
∑V
v=1 τvλ˜v = 0,
where v and v represent the lowest and highest mass-points. (See Appendix A.4 for details.)
Second, to reduce the computational burden it is convenient to concentrate the industry-
year-speciﬁc intercepts out of the likelihood function. Given the normalizations for τv and
λ˜v, it is straightforward to show that the ﬁrst order condition for these intercept parameters
implies that the optimal estimate for each am,jt is simply ym,jt, the industry-year mean of
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the corresponding dependent variable, regardless of the bm,t, τv and λ˜v,46 and I insert those
estimates before searching over the other parameters. Third, while the locations of the
mass-points, the probability associated with each mass-point, and the error variances are
bounded, it is convenient to allow the search algorithm to search over auxiliary parameters
deﬁned over the real line and then transform those auxiliary parameters to satisfy the
constraints. (See Appendix A.4 for details.) Fourth, one must choose starting values for
the search algorithm. My approach is to use OLS estimates from the estimation of (8a)-(8e)
using log domestic sales in each period (deviated from industry-year means and standardized
to have variance 1) as a measure of λ˜ij. Fifth, one must choose the number of mass-points,
V . There is little agreement among empirical researchers about the best way to make this
choice. Mroz (1999) suggests beginning with a small number of points and using likelihood-
ratio tests to determine whether to add an additional point of support. I begin with two
points; if the likelihood ratio test indicates that the model can be rejected at 95% conﬁdence
in favor of a model with an additional point of support, I add the additional point.47 The
lowest number of mass-points that is not rejected by this procedure is 10; hence I set V = 10.
6.1.1 Estimates
Table 6 reports the results from maximizing the likelihood function (12) for the variables









where ym,jt ≡ 1Ij
IjP
i=1
ym,ijt and Ij is the number of plants in industry j. Given the above normalizations,
the second term is zero.
47Mroz (1999) uses a 75% criterion, rather than 95%.
48Figure 12 suggests that the assumption of linearity of the relationship between the log wage variables
and the underlying productivity term, as proxied by domestic sales, is not unreasonable, but one might be
more concerned about the export share variable, which is censored at zero for many plants and is more
likely to show a sharp discontinuity at the margin for entry into the export market. To address this concern,
I estimated a separate model that drops the export share equation (8a) and instead includes a discrete
choice for whether to be an exporter and an equation for log export sales conditional on being an exporter,
allowing for correlation in the error terms between the two equations. With the introduction of the non-
linearity, it is no longer possible to deviate from industry-year means to avoid estimating intercept terms.
For the two new equations, I estimated separate industry-year intercepts for the 9 two-digit industries in
manufacturing, adding 54 parameters to the model. The model yielded slope coeﬃcients in the discrete-
choice exporter equation and the export sales equation increasing over 1993-1997 more than over 1997-2001,
and slope estimates for the other dependent variables that were qualitatively consistent with those in Table
6. Because the results are qualitatively similar between the two models, I focus here on the simpler, fully
linearized model.
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in brackets are based on 50 bootstrap replications using the reported point estimates as
starting values. In the bootstrap procedure, I re-sample the nine-year histories of plants,
rather than particular plant-year observations, as suggested by Kapetanios (2004). Consider
the results for the export share, white-collar wages, blue-collar wages, and capital intensity
(Columns 1-4). We see that these slope estimates in the top panel are all positive and highly
signiﬁcant, consistent with the theoretical model and the reduced-form patterns illustrated
in Figure 12.49 Note also that the slope coeﬃcients for white-collar wages are signiﬁcantly
greater than the slopes for blue-collar wages in each year; this indicates that the slopes
for the wage ratio would also be positive. The results in the bottom panel indicate that
the diﬀerences in slopes between 1993 and 1997 for these variables are greater than the
diﬀerences in slopes between 1997 and 2001. The diﬀerences in diﬀerences in slopes for
these variables are signiﬁcant at the 1% level. These results are consistent with the results
from the proxy-variable strategy above.
An advantage of the latent-factor strategy over the proxy-variable strategy is that we
can treat plant size as an outcome variable. Consider the results for white-collar hours, blue-
collar hours, and domestic sales in Columns 5-7. The estimates of the slope coeﬃcients in
the top panel indicate that higher-λ˜ plants are indeed larger, in terms of both employment
and domestic sales. Turning to changes in slopes in the bottom panel, we see that the
diﬀerence in slope coeﬃcients for white-collar hours is close to zero and insigniﬁcant for
both the 1993-1997 period and the 1997-2001 period. The diﬀerence in diﬀerences in slopes
is also insigniﬁcant. Interestingly, there is some evidence of a greater diﬀerential increase
in blue-collar hours in higher-λ˜ plants in the peso-crisis period. But the key point is that
there is no evidence of diﬀerential increases in demand for white-collar hours in higher-
λ˜ plants that might explain the wage patterns in Columns 2-3. In addition, note that
in 1997 and 2001, the slopes for the white-collar and blue-collar hours equations are not
statistically distinguishable from one another, indicating that higher-λ˜ plants did not employ
a greater share of white-collar workers. The results for diﬀerences in slopes for domestic sales
in Column 7, bottom panel, suggest that there are indeed diﬀerential background trends
between higher- and lower-domestic-sales plants. The diﬀerences in slopes between 1993
and 1997 and between 1997 and 2001 are of the same magnitude, however. The diﬀerence
in diﬀerences in slopes is not signiﬁcant.
49The magnitudes of these coeﬃcients depend on the arbitrary normalization assumption for the mass-
point estimates described above. The information content of the estimates lies in their relation to one
another, not in their magnitudes.
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I extend the baseline latent-factor estimates by adding ISO 9000 certiﬁcation as an
observable variable and estimating using the EIA-ENESTyC Panel. Table 7 presents the
results.50 The key results are for ISO 9000 certiﬁcation in Column 1. There is clear evidence
that the slope coeﬃcient increased more over the peso-crisis period than over the later
period. The results for wages, capital-intensity and hours are similar to those in Table 6.
Once again, caution is warranted in interpreting these results, since ISO 9000 certiﬁcation
is far from an ideal measure of product quality. But it is reassuring that these results are
consistent with those for the proxy-variable strategy, as well as with the theoretical model.
7 Alternative Hypotheses
The identiﬁcation strategy of this paper, like other triple-diﬀerence-type research designs,
relies on the assumption that there are no other factors generating a diﬀerence in diﬀerential
wage trends between high-λ and low-λ plants. But the peso crisis had many eﬀects on the
Mexican economy, and one might argue that some of them generated such a diﬀerence in
diﬀerential trends. The leading candidate is the banking crisis and general contraction of
credit that followed the exchange-rate devaluation.
To address this concern, I draw on balance sheet data from publicly listed ﬁrms on the
Mexican stock market over the 1989-2000 period. These are the data used by Pratap and
Urrutia (2004) and Aguiar (2005), and are the most detailed micro-data with balance-sheet
information available in Mexico. Summary statistics are in Table 8. In these data, exporting
plants have a signiﬁcantly larger share of their debt in dollar-denominated loans than do
non-exporting plants. In manufacturing in 1993, the dollar-denominated shares of short-
term debt were 38% and 20% for exporters and non-exporters respectively. For long-term
debt, the corresponding ﬁgures were 36% and 13%. As a consequence, the balance sheets
of exporting plants are likely to have been more adversely aﬀected by the peso devaluation
than those of non-exporters. However, exporters also face a lower cost of capital (deﬁned as
the ratio of total interest payments to total debt) than non-exporters; in manufacturing in
1993, the cost of capital was 12.5% for exporters and 17.8% for non-exporters. This suggests
that increased exports may have diﬀerentially reduced the cost of capital for initially more-
productive plants. To investigate this, Table 9 presents regressions of the form of (7) with
the change in the cost of capital as the dependent variable. In order for the lower cost of
50I also estimated the non-linear model described in footnote 48 with a discrete choice for whether a plant
has ISO 9000 certiﬁcation. The results were again qualitatively similar to those presented here.
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capital for exporters to explain the diﬀerential wage changes, it would have to be the case
that the cost of capital declined more for initially larger plants than initially smaller ones
during the peso crisis period, and that this relative decline was greater in magnitude during
the peso crisis period than during the 1989-1993 or 1997-2000 periods. In fact, the point
estimates for the 1993-1997 period are positive in all speciﬁcations, and not signiﬁcantly
smaller than the coeﬃcients for the other periods. There is no evidence that diﬀerential
changes in the cost of capital can explain the diﬀerential wage changes of Table 2.51
One might still be worried that some factor unrelated to exports generated the diﬀerence
in diﬀerential trends. One way to investigate this possibility is to examine whether the same
diﬀerential trends are displayed even within a set of plants that saw no diﬀerential change
in exports over the period — the maquiladora plants participating in the government’s
export-promotion program.52 When the maquiladora program began in 1965, maquiladoras
were required to export 100% of their output. Although this requirement has gradually been
loosened since 1989, maquiladora plants continue to export nearly all of their output.53 Thus
the peso devaluation, although it was a boon to the sector as a whole, did not generate a
diﬀerential change in the extent of exporting between larger and smaller, or more-productive
and less-productive, maquiladora plants. Table 10 presents a comparison of results for the
non-maquiladora sector (from the EIA 1993-2001 panel) and the maquiladora sector (from
a balanced panel for the same period created from the EMIME data, described in Appendix
B). The proxy for initial productivity is log employment and the wage variables are average
hourly wages, white-collar yearly earnings, and blue-collar yearly earnings since those are
the variables that can be compared across datasets. The results for the maquiladora sector
are quite distinct from those for the non-maquiladora sector. The point estimates on initial
log employment for the 1993-1997 period are negative. In the later period the coeﬃcients are
signiﬁcantly larger than in the earlier period. It does not appear that the diﬀerential wage
51This is consistent with the conclusion of Aguiar (2005, p. 106): “Given that export propensity and
foreign debt composition are signiﬁcantly correlated ... the balance sheet eﬀect is oﬀsetting much of the
beneﬁts of the real devaluation.”
52An alternative approach would be to focus on initially small plants that are likely to be below the
export margin even after the devaluation. Estimates of (7) for plants initially below median domestic sales
in each industry yield diﬀerential wage trends similar to those in Table 2, which ostensibly casts doubt on
the quality upgrading hypothesis. But this test is not as clean as the comparison with maquiladoras, because
even plants that report zero domestic sales may be producing intermediate goods for plants that export or
may be selling on the export market through a distributor; export-driven quality upgrading may be present
even among plants that report zero direct exports.
53Although the fraction of revenues from export vs. domestic sales is not reported in the published
statistics, INEGI has carried out unpublished surveys, and has consistently found that maquiladoras sell less
than 5% of their output domestically. (Source: personal communication with Gerardo Durand, Director of
Statistics of International Trade, Administrative Records, and Prices, INEGI.)
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changes in the non-maquiladora sector are due to a generalized diﬀerential trend between
larger and smaller, or more-productive and less-productive plants.54
These results for the maquiladora sector also argue against the outsourcing hypothesis
of Feenstra and Hanson (1996) as an explanation for the diﬀerential wage trends in Table
2. Feenstra and Hanson hypothesize that U.S. ﬁrms outsource production activities that
are low-skill for the U.S. but high-skill for Mexico, raising skill demands in both places.
One would expect this mechanism to be strongest in the maquiladoras, which are explic-
itly dedicated to outsourcing from Northern ﬁrms. The outsourcing hypothesis provides a
compelling account of the upgrading of the maquiladora sector over time, but the fact that
we do not see the greater diﬀerential wage changes between larger and smaller plants in the
peso-crisis period in the maquiladora sector suggests the outsourcing hypothesis is unlikely
to explain the diﬀerential wage changes we observe in non-maquiladora sector.55
Rent-sharing may also explain the wage patterns we observe, if upgrading plants are
more proﬁtable and those proﬁts are shared with workers. There are two distinct theories
often lumped under the rubric of rent-sharing. The ﬁrst is that plants or ﬁrms share proﬁts
for proﬁt-maximizing reasons: employee morale would suﬀer if rents were not shared. In
the context of this paper, it may be that production of higher-quality goods for the export
market is particularly sensitive to employee morale, and for this reason quality upgrading
requires increased rent-sharing. This hypothesis can be viewed as a friendly variant of the
eﬃciency-wage interpretation of equations (4a)-(4b), rather than as an alternative to the
quality-upgrading hypothesis.
The second theory is that managers have an objective apart from maximizing proﬁts —
to live a quiet life, for instance — that leads them to share more rents than would be optimal
54This conclusion is reinforced by two additional ﬁndings. First, using data from the Mexican social
security agency that covers a set of non-tradable sectors (construction, transportation, retail, and service)
in addition to the manufacturing (tradable) sector, Appendix Table 3 provides evidence of a signiﬁcantly
greater diﬀerence in diﬀerential trends in manufacturing than in the non-tradable sectors. For further details,
see Appendix B and Kaplan and Verhoogen (2006). Second, Kandilov (2005, Ch. 2), building explicitly
on the framework of an earlier incarnation of this paper (Verhoogen, 2004), uses exogenous variation in
the incentive to export from an export-subsidy program in Chile, rather than a macroeconomic shock, and
ﬁnds that industries oﬀered the subsidy displayed greater wage growth for white-collar workers than non-
subsidized industries, and that within subsidized industries initially larger and more productive plants saw
greater wage increases for both white-collar and blue-collar workers than initially smaller or less productive
plants.
55It is also worth noting that the Feenstra-Hanson mechanism relies on shifts between activities of diﬀerent
skill intensity within industries to explain wage changes. Although the model does not carry predictions
for which particular plants will undertake the new skill-intensive activities, one would expect the higher-λ
plants to be the most likely candidates. We have seen that there is no evidence that higher-λ plants raised
their white-collar employment share more than lower-λ plants in the same industry. Hence it seems unlikely
that shifts between activities of diﬀerent skill intensities are driving the diﬀerential wage changes.
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for the plant or ﬁrm as a whole. We might term this “non-proﬁt-maximizing rent-sharing.”
In this view, one might argue that the increased exports of high-λ˜ plants led them to raise
wages relative to low-λ˜ plants simply because the high-λ˜ plants saw a diﬀerential increase
in proﬁts. One could add the additional twist that managers are likely to be more friendly
with, and oﬀer rents to, white-collar workers. This theory is quite ﬂexible, and diﬃcult to
refute for that reason, but three arguments suggest that the non-proﬁt-maximizing rent-
sharing hypothesis is not a complete explanation of the wage patterns we observe.
First, one might expect local managers at foreign-owned plants to have less latitude to
share rents, since they have to report to ﬁnancial oﬃcers in far-away corporate headquarters
who presumably do not share those managers’ non-proﬁt-maximizing objectives. Table 11
presents estimates of (7) separately for plants with more than 10% and less than 10%
foreign ownership in 1994. The qualitative patterns within each subgroup are similar to
the results for the entire sample. Although there is no evidence of diﬀerential changes in
blue-collar wages in foreign-owned plants (Column 3, top panel), there is strong evidence
of a diﬀerential eﬀect of the peso crisis on white-collar wages in those plants (Column 2,
top panel). Second, it is possible to control for the eﬀect of improved plant performance in
a regression context, and when we do, the basic patterns of diﬀerential changes in wages
between high-λ˜ and low-λ˜ plants hold up. Table 12 presents regressions of the form of
(7), but including the change in log revenues as an additional covariate to capture the
rent-sharing eﬀect.56 The coeﬃcients on change in log revenues are positive and signiﬁcant
for the export share and wage variables, and negative and signiﬁcant for the capital-labor
ratio and the employment ratio. These estimates are consistent with the view that plants
share rents and that plants are able to adjust blue-collar employment more quickly than
white-collar employment and capital intensity to a positive demand shock for exports. But
the important message of the table is that the coeﬃcients on the initial log domestic sales
term in each period are largely unaﬀected by the inclusion of the change in log revenues.
Third, the non-proﬁt-maximizing rent-sharing hypothesis cannot explain the results from
the EIA-ENESTyC panel reported in Table 4 — in particular, the diﬀerential trends in
ISO 9000 certiﬁcation and average schooling of blue-collar workers. While it is certainly
possible that non-proﬁt-maximizing rent-sharing is playing some role, it seems unlikely that
rent-sharing is the entire explanation for the various empirical patterns we observe.
56The diﬀerential changes in wages between high-λ˜ and low-λ˜ plants also hold up if the change in price-cost
margins are included as a covariate in place of the change in log revenues. The change in log revenues is
preferable as a covariate because it is more accurately measured, and wage changes enter into the calculation
of changes in price-cost margins, which makes them susceptible to biases introduced by measurement error.
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A ﬁnal alternative hypothesis to be considered is the scale-economies hypothesis of
Yeaple (2005). Yeaple (2005) presents a model in which ﬁrms can choose between a more
modern, high-ﬁxed-cost, low-variable-cost technology that requires more-skilled workers and
an older, low ﬁxed cost, high variable cost technology that requires less-skilled workers. An
increase in the scale of production leads more ﬁrms to adopt the more modern technology,
raising the demand for skill and the wages of more-skilled workers.57 If we extend the
model to our context, the argument would be that the exchange-rate devaluation generated
a diﬀerential change in the scale of production between high-λ˜ and low-λ˜ plants, which
generated diﬀerential changes in technology choice, which in turn generated diﬀerential
changes in skill demands. Three pieces of evidence argue against this mechanism in this
case. First, there is little evidence that initially more-productive plants increased in scale
more than initially less-productive ones, since they saw a greater decrease in domestic
sales at the same time as a greater increase in exports; see Table 6 Columns 5-7 and the
accompanying discussion. Second, when the change in scale is controlled for explicitly as
in Table 12, the estimates of the coeﬃcient on the initial value of the λ proxy are largely
unaﬀected. Third, the scale-eﬀects hypothesis, like the outsourcing hypothesis, relies on
increases in the employment share of skilled workers to drive wage changes; as noted above,
there is no evidence that upgrading plants increased the white-collar share of employment
or increased average skill within the white-collar category.
8 Conclusion
This paper has proposed a new mechanism linking trade and wage inequality in Mexico:
quality upgrading due to increased exports. It has oﬀered robust evidence that initially
larger, more productive plants were more likely to increase exports, white-collar wages,
blue-collar wages, and ISO 9000 certiﬁcation than initially smaller, less productive plants
during the peso-crisis period (1993-1997), and that this diﬀerential change was greater than
during adjacent periods without devaluations (1989-1993 and 1997-2001). The pattern in
1986-1989, also a period of devaluation of the peso, is similar to that of 1993-1997. These
ﬁndings are robust to the choice of proxy for plant productivity, and do not appear to
be explained by a variety of alternative hypotheses. There is also (somewhat less robust)
evidence that the diﬀerential wage changes were greater for white-collar than for blue-collar
57Bustos (2005) has recently incorporated this insight into a monopolistic competition framework with
heterogeneous ﬁrms.
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workers, suggesting that quality upgrading leads to increases in within-plant wage inequality
as well as to increased wage dispersion across plants. Results from a latent-factor strategy
that avoids the need to construct proxies reinforce these ﬁndings. These results support
the hypothesis that exporting-induced quality upgrading has contributed to rising wage
inequality within industries in the Mexican manufacturing sector.
An important question that remains unanswered is the extent to which the quality-
upgrading mechanism can be generalized to other contexts. On the basis of the theoretical
model, we would expect any bilateral reduction in trade costs — due to a trade agreement
or declining transport costs, for instance — to have eﬀects similar to those of an exchange-
rate devaluation. The incentive to export would increase and domestic sales would decrease
— in this case because of an increase in import competition rather than a contraction
of domestic demand — generating a diﬀerential increase in the export share and hence
diﬀerential quality upgrading within industries. Case-study evidence (Gereﬃ, 1999; Nadvi,
1999) also suggests that quality upgrading may be a more general phenomenon. If so, the
quality upgrading hypothesis may be a part of the explanation of the link between trade
liberalization and wage inequality more broadly.
The main relevance of the quality-upgrading hypothesis to policy debates may lie in its
identiﬁcation of a new dimension of relative winners and losers from trade in developing
countries. In the simplest Hecksher-Ohlin model, the relative winners are unskilled workers,
and the relative losers are skilled workers and owners of capital. From this perspective, it is
a mystery why many unskilled workers in developing countries protest against globalization,
and why many of the foremost proponents of globalization are educated, urban elites. In
the quality-upgrading view, by contrast, the relative winners are the entrepreneurs and
employees, especially the most skilled, with either the qualiﬁcations or the good fortune to be
employed in the most modern, export-oriented plants within each industry, and the relative
losers are the entrepreneurs and employees, especially the unskilled, in less-productive,
domestically oriented plants. In this view, both the enthusiasm for globalization of the
relatively better-oﬀ and the pessimism of the relatively worse-oﬀ may make economic sense.
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A Theory Appendix
A.1 Comparative-Static Results for Entry
This appendix signs the comparative statics for the entry cutoﬀs for Southern plants into
the Southern and Northern markets. It is convenient to rewrite (5a)-(5g) so that they
are symmetric for Southern and Northern plants. To this end, let c index the location of
production (c = n, s) and ψcd be the ratio of the price level in destination market d to the
price level in production location c, and write prices in terms of the home-country price
level, as in (1). (That is, ψss = ψnn = δs = 1 and ψsn = 1ψns = δn.) Then (5a)-(5g),
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Using (A.2), deﬁne the Jacobian for the proﬁt functions πcd for c, d ∈ {s, n} (suppressing


















































































































































































































































































< 0. Under the assumption the Northern market is large relative to
A.2
the number of plants in South, ∂Dn∂ψsn ≈ 0 and
∂λminsn
∂ψsn
< 0. The increase in ψsn with the
devaluation leads to more entry of Southern plants into both markets.
A.2 Changes in Export Share of Output
In the notation of (5a)-(5g) (not the notation of Appendix A.1), consider the eﬀect of the
exchange-rate shock on the export share of output of Southern plants (suppressing the








































where the inequality follows from the facts that dδn > 0 and dNs < 0.
Now consider how the change in the export share varies with entrepreneurial ability,
that is, how dχ varies with λ. As a preliminary step, note that:
∂χ
∂λ










[θnqn(λ)− θsqs(λ)] > 0 (A.7)








dδn > 0 (A.8)
using (5a), where Γ is deﬁned in (A.6). Then from (A.6):
∂
∂λ
(dχ) = (1− 2χs)Γ∂χs
∂λ
+ χ (1− χ) ∂Γ
∂λ




Assuming diﬀerentiability of the export share of output, a ﬁrst-order Taylor approximation
of (6a)-(6h) around λ yields (8a)-(8h), where the εm for m = 1, 2, ..., 8 are the approximation
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It follows from (5a)-(5f) and the facts that θn > θs and δn ≥ δs that bm > 0 for m = 1, 2, ..., 8.
In addition, it follows from these facts and (A.6) (under the assumption that χ(λ) < 12 )
that the increase in δn and the decrease in Ns have the eﬀect of increasing b1, b2, b3, b4 and
b5. Note, by contrast, that the eﬀect of the exchange rate shock on b6 and b7 is ambiguous;
the shock raises xn(λ) and qn(λ) but may reduce xs(λ).
A.4 Parameterizations for Maximum-Likelihood Estimation
This section details the parameter transformations used by the search algorithm to maximize
the likelihood function (12).58
Parameterization for the Probabilities
Given the constraint that they must sum to 1, the probabilities τv for v = 1, 2, .., V can be
expressed in terms of V − 1 auxiliary parameters, hv, where each hv is deﬁned over the real
58I am indebted to Tom Mroz for suggesting the parameterization for the probabilities and a parameteri-
zation for the mass points very similar to the one employed below.
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line:






for v = 1, 2, ..., V − 1






Parameterization for the Mass Points
Given the scale normalization discussed in Section 6.1.1, the mass points λ˜v for v = 1, 2, ..., V
can be expressed in terms of V − 2 auxiliary parameters, ξv, where each ξv is deﬁned over






Then deviate from the expected mean of λ˜′:








Parameterization for the Error Variances
The standard errors in (12), σm for m = 1, 2, ..., 8, are expressed in terms of auxiliary
parameters fm that are deﬁned on the real line as:
σm = efm for m = 1, 2, ..., 8
A.5
B Data Appendix
B.1 Encuesta Industrial Anual (EIA)
The Encuesta Industrial Anual (EIA) is carried out yearly, in the spring, with data referring
to the previous calendar year. It contains information on employment, hours, wages, expen-
ditures, sales, other revenues, inventories, and capital assets and investment. A companion
survey, the Encuesta Industrial Mensual (EIM) [Monthly Industrial Survey], is carried out
monthly using a less extensive survey at the same set of plants; the EIM is the source of
information on wages and employment for the two occupational categories, obreros (pro-
duction, or blue-collar, workers) and empleados (non-production, or white-collar, workers).
INEGI has two separate dataﬁles, one covering the 1993-2001 period and an earlier on cov-
ering the 1984-1994 period.59 On the basis of these datasets, I created two balanced panels,
which I refer to simply as the EIA 1993-2001 Panel and the EIA 1984-2001 Panel, and one
unbalanced panel, which I refer to as the EIA 1993-2001 Unbalanced Panel.
B.1.1 Sampling Design
In 1993, 205 of the 309 6-digit industries (clases) in the Mexican industrial classiﬁcation
system were chosen to be included in the EIA.60 From a list of the universe of manufactur-
ing plants in Mexico (generated in preparation for the upcoming 1994 industrial census),
non-maquiladora plants within each clase were ranked in decreasing order of the value of
production (valor de produccio´n), the value of the output of the plant priced at the “factory”
price (venta de fabrica). Plants were then selected in decreasing order of value of output
until the set of selected plants made up 85% of the total value of output (not including
maquiladoras) of the clase. This rule was subject to the following qualiﬁcations:
1. If a plant employed 100 or more workers, it was added to the sample, regardless of
whether the 85% level had been reached.
2. If more than 100 plants were required to cover 85% of output within the clase, the
number of plants was limited to 100. (There were no cases in which this rule conﬂicted
with (1).)
3. If four or fewer plants made up 85% or more of total output of the clase, then to
preserve the conﬁdentiality of those plants, all plants in the clase were included,
superseding rule (2).
These criteria generated an initial sample of 7,157 plants in 1993. These plants were
subsequently followed over time. Speciﬁc analysts in the INEGI oﬃces in Aguascalientes,
Mexico, are assigned to follow particular plants over time, and to double-check inconsis-
tencies or sudden changes in the plant, in many cases by calling the establishment on the
59The earlier dataset is also described in the data appendix of Grether (1996).
60The Mexican industrial classiﬁcation on which the surveys used in this paper are based is the Clasificac´ıon
Mexicana de Actividades y Productos (CMAP) [Mexican Classiﬁcation of Activities and Products]. It is
organized in 6-digit industries called clases (classes), 4-digit industries called ramas (branches), and 2-digit
industries called divisiones (divisions). The classiﬁcation was revised in 1993. The initial sample for the
1993-2001 EIA and EIM panels was drawn in 1993 using the updated classiﬁcation, usually referred to as
CMAP-94. (It was published in 1994.) In the manufacturing sector in the CMAP-94, there are 309 clases,
54 ramas, and 9 divisiones.
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phone. The same is true for the monthly EIM survey of the same plants. As a result, the
quality of the data in the EIA and EIM tends to be better than in surveys with less regular
contact between the INEGI analysts and the survey respondents.
A small number of plants were added to the survey after 1993, but they were not added
in a systematic way, and I ignore the new establishments. The questionnaire used in the
EIA changed over time prior to 1997. In 1997, a consistent format for the questionnaire
was settled upon, and has since remained in eﬀect. Variables collected prior to 1997 that
are no longer included in the survey have been discarded from the dataset. An exception is
foreign ownership, which was collected in 1994 but not thereafter, which has been preserved
and can still be linked to the ongoing panel.
An important advantage of the EIA and the EIM is that the analysts tracking each
establishment keep track of why some establishments fail to respond or respond in an ir-
regular way. I classiﬁed plants that went bankrupt or suspended operations as non-random
exiters.61 I classiﬁed plants that switched to industries not covered by the survey, that
switched from manufacturing to wholesale or retail sales, that merged with other establish-
ments, or that failed to provide data for an unexplained reason are classiﬁed as random
exiters. I assume that these random exiters are ignorable in the sense of Griliches (1986).
The 1984-2001 panel used in this paper was formed by linking the 1993-2001 panel with
the earlier 1984-1994 panel. The design of the 1984-1994 sample was similar to that of
the 1993-2001 sample. In 1984, under an earlier industrial classiﬁcation system, 129 clases
were selected for the panel. Establishments within each clase were chosen following the
same criteria described for the 1993-2001 panel above. The principal diﬀerence was that
establishments were included within each industry until 80% of the total value of production
in the industry was covered. The initial sample consisted of 3,199 plants. The EIA surveys
prior to 1992 did not elicit information on exports. Information on exports is available
from supplementary surveys funded by the World Bank for the same sample of plants, but
only for the years 1986-1990. Data on exports are thus not available for 1984-1985 or 1991.
Many plants can not be linked from the 1984-1994 to 1993-2001 samples because industry
deﬁnitions and the set of industries surveyed diﬀer between the two panels. Because the
EIA focuses on large plants, however, it is still possible to link a signiﬁcant number of
establishments.
At least since 1989, the instructions for the EIA have request that respondents report
the average number of workers, either permanent or casual, paid or unpaid, who worked in
the plant and were under the control of the plant’s management. In 2000, the instructions
were clariﬁed to specify that this includes workers working under subcontract for other
ﬁrms. No information is available on whether the workers are formal, in the sense of being
oﬃcially registered with the Mexican social security agency, or informal. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that many workers not registered with the social security agency are still reported
in the EIA, and hence that the EIA employment totals include some informal workers.
B.1.2 Cleaning Procedure
The cleaning procedure for the 1993-2001 data was the following:
1. I removed establishments that report data for more than one establishment or that
61The set of plants that suspended operations includes plants that suspended operations due to strikes or
to shortages of materials.
B.2
have their data reported by another establishment. In some multi-establishment ﬁrms,
survey respondents are unable or unwilling to report information separately for each
establishment. In these cases, respondents report joint data for the establishments
on a single survey. Only in 1998 did INEGI begin keeping track systematically of the
reporting patterns. Establishments that have their information reported elsewhere
are easy to identify; their records appears in zeros. Establishments that report infor-
mation for more other establishments in the same ﬁrm are more diﬃcult to identify. I
discarded any establishment that had its information reported elsewhere in any year,
and discarded any establishment that reported information from another establish-
ment in 1998 or later.
2. I removed establishments owned in whole or in part by government entities.
3. I removed establishments that appear in any year to be maquiladoras. It is possible
that some were included in the EIA sample by mistake, either because of errors in
sampling or because plants entered the government’s maquiladora program subsequent
to the drawing of the EIA sample. I classify a plant as a maquiladora if either of the
following conditions is satisﬁed:
(a) The plant derives 95% or more of its sales from exports.
(b) The plant derives 95% or more of its total revenues from income from subcon-
tracting services (ingresos por servicios de maquila), which are not reported
under sales.62
4. I removed establishments that exited randomly, by the above deﬁnition, in any year
during the 1993-2001 period.
5. I set to missing the values of key variables that changed by more than a factor of ﬁve
from one year to the next. This procedure was carried out for: total employment, blue-
collar employment, white-collar employment, total hours, blue-collar hours, white-
collar hours, real total remuneration, real blue-collar remuneration, real white-collar
remuneration, real domestic sales.
6. I imputed new values for missing values using a variant of the sequential regression
multivariate imputation technique (Raghunathan, Lepkowski, Hoewyk, and Solen-
berger, 2001) as implemented by Abowd and Woodcock (2001). The steps were the
following:
(a) I classiﬁed variables into ﬁve groups:
Group 1: total employment, total hours, total remuneration, total sales.
Group 2: materials costs, electricity costs, revenues, capital stock.
Group 3: blue-collar employment, white-collar employment, blue-collar hours,
white-collar hours, blue-collar remuneration, white-collar remuneration.
Group 4: initial capital stock in machinery and equipment, initial capital stock
in land and buildings, initial capital stock in transportation equipment and
other assets, all in 1993.
62While it is possible that the income from subcontracting services is for domestic subcontracting, the
more likely explanation is that such income reﬂects assembly for export.
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Group 5: foreign ownership, investment in machinery and equipment, invest-
ment in land and buildings, investment in transportation equipment and
other assets, export share, imported inputs share.
(b) For Group 1, I regressed each variable (in the order given) on the other variables
in the group, a lead and lag of the same variable, and year dummies, using the
plants remaining in the sample after the steps above. (All variables in logs,
deﬂated as described in section B.1.3 below.) The predicted values from this
regression were imputed for the missing values.63
(c) For Group 2, I regressed each variable on the other variables in Groups 1-2, a
lead and a lag of the same variable, and year dummies, and imputed with the
predicted values. For Group 3, I did the same, including variables from Groups
1-3.
(d) For Group 4, I regressed each variable on the variables in Groups 1-3 and a lead
of the same variable, and imputed with the predicted values.
(e) The Group 5 variables had to be dealt with specially, due to their discreteness or
censoring. For foreign ownership, I estimated a probit on Group 1-4 variables in
1994 (the only year during 1993-2001 that foreign ownership is observed), then
drew randomly from a Bernoulli distribution with probability of success equal to
the predicted probability from the probit. For each of the investment variables,
I ﬁrst imputed whether investment was zero or positive, following the same pro-
cedure as for foreign ownership; I then took predicted values from a regression
of investment on Group 1-4 variables to replace the missing values. Schafer and
Olsen (2000) argue that this “two-part” method is preferable to a tobit model in
cases such as this one where zero values are economically meaningful, rather than
being stand-ins for latent negative values.64 For export share, I ﬁrst imputed do-
mestic sales using Group 1-4 variables as in step 6c above, then imputed export
sales using the same method as for investment in this step, then calculated ex-
port share and used it to rescale domestic and export sales to sum to total sales
from step 6b. For imported inputs share, I followed the same procedure as for
export share.
7. I re-checked the imputed values from the previous step to see whether values changed
by more than a factor of ﬁve from one year to the next, and, if so, set them again to
missing.
8. I removed establishments that were missing data on key variables after steps 1-7. Es-
tablishments classiﬁed as non-exiters were removed if they were missing data in any
year over the 1993-2001 period. Establishments classiﬁed as non-random exiters were
removed if they were missing data in any year prior to the year of exit. The key
variables were blue-collar employment, white-collar employment, total employment,
blue-collar hours, white-collar hours, total hours, blue-collar remuneration, white-
collar remuneration, total remuneration, domestic sales, export sales total sales, the
63If a lead and/or lag was missing, I used the predicted value from an analogous regression without a lead
and/or lag.
64Note that the two-part method is equivalent a Heckman (1976) selection model with the correlation
between the errors in the two stages set to zero.
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investment variables, the initial capital stock variables, foreign ownership, geographi-
cal location (state), materials costs, and electricity costs.
Appendix Table 4 summarizes the numbers of plants lost in each step. In the end we are
left with a balanced panel of 3,263 plants that have complete data over the entire 1993-2001
period, and an unbalanced panel that includes 1,139 additional plants that went out of
business during the period.
Following a suggestion of Angrist and Krueger (1999), I “winsorized” the key variables
at the tails, replacing values in the lower or upper 1% tails with values at the 1st and 99th
percentiles, respectively. The following variables were winsorized: total employment, blue-
collar employment, white-collar employment, total hours, blue-collar hours, white-collar
hours, real average wage, real blue-collar wage, real white-collar wage, white-collar/blue-
collar wage ratio, real domestic sales, real revenues, real capital-labor ratio.
The cleaning procedure for the 1984-1994 EIA dataset was similar to that for the 1993-
2001 dataset. The 1984-1994 dataset indicates neither whether multi-establishment ﬁrms
have consolidated information under one establishment nor whether plants have public
ownership, so steps 1 and 2 were skipped. Also, the 1984-1994 EIA dataset does not contain
information on the reason for exit, so step 4 was skipped as well. I took the information from
1984-1992 from the 1984-1994 dataset, and information for 1993-2001 from the 1993-2001
dataset.65
The facts that we do not know the reason for exit in 1984-1994 and that the sampling
design of the EIA changed for the 1993-2001 dataset would make the analysis of an unbal-
anced 1984-2001 panel diﬃcult. Instead, I focus on the balanced 1984-2001 panel. After
the cleaning procedure, there are 1,114 establishments that appear with complete data over
the entire 1984-2001 period.
Capital stock was constructed using the perpetual-inventory method. I classiﬁed capital
into three types: machinery and equipment, land and buildings, and transportation equip-
ment and other ﬁxed assets. Following Olley and Pakes (1996), each type of capital was
assumed to evolve according to:
Kjt = (1− δj)Kjt−1 + ijt−1
where j indexes the three types of capital. Following Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), the
depreciation rates, δj for machinery and equipment, land and buildings, and transportation
equipment were assumed to be 10%, 5% and 20% respectively. Total capital stock is the
sum of the three types of capital. I took the book value of capital stock in the initial year
(1984 or 1993 depending on the panel) as the initial value. Both the initial book value and
subsequent investments are measured in thousands of 1994 pesos, deﬂated by the producer
price index.66
65As mentioned above, the 1984-1994 dataset does not include information on export vs. domestic sales
or imported vs. domestic inputs in 1984, 1985 or 1991. These variables were not included in the cleaning
procedure for those years.




Employment (white-collar, blue-collar, total) = average yearly employment for non-production
workers (empleados), production workers (obreros), and all workers, respectively.
White-collar hourly wage = total white-collar wage bill/total hours worked by white-collar
workers, deﬂated to 1994 pesos using the main consumer price index (INPC) from
Banco de Mexico, the Mexican central bank.
Blue-collar hourly wage = total blue-collar wage bill/total hours worked by blue-collar
workers, deﬂated to 1994 pesos by consumer price index.
Wage ratio = white-collar hourly wage/blue-collar real hourly wage.
White-collar employment share = white-collar hours worked/total hours worked
Domestic sales = domestic sales as reported, measured in thousands of 1994 pesos, deﬂated
by the producer price index (INPP) from Banco de Mexico.
Export sales = export sales as reported, measured in thousands of 1994 pesos, deﬂated by
the producer price index.
Export share of sales = export sales/(domestic sales + export sales).
Exporter = 1 if export percentage of sales > 0, = 0 otherwise.
Capital-labor ratio = real capital stock/total employment.
Foreign ownership indicator = 1 if plant had ≥ 10% foreign ownership in 1994 (the only
year for which data were available during 1993-2001), = 0 otherwise.
Revenues = total sales + income from subcontracting for other plants - expenditures on
subcontracting by other plants, in thousands of 1994 pesos, deﬂated by producer price
index.67
B.2 Encuesta Nacional de Empleo, Salarios, Tecnolog´ıa y Capacitac´ıon
(ENESTyC)
The Encuesta Nacional de Empleo, Salarios, Tecnolog´ıa y Capacitac´ıon (ENESTyC) [Na-
tional Survey of Employment, Wages, Technology and Training] is a special survey that
includes qualitative questions regarding training, turnover, technology use and a variety of
workplace practices. It was carried out in 1992, 1995, 1999, and 2001 with many of the
questions referring to the previous calendar year. The survey covered 5,071 establishments
in 1992, 5,242 in 1995, 7,429 in 1999, and 8,856 in 2001. Unlike the EIA, the ENESTyC is
based on a representative sample of plants and includes maquiladoras. The sampling frame
in each year was stratiﬁed by total employment, with plants with 100 or more employees
sampled with certainty, and a sample of plants with fewer than 100 employees drawn at
random. In 1995, two samples were drawn. One was a probabilistic sample similar to the
samples in 1992, 1999, and 2001, with the diﬀerence that maquiladoras were excluded. The
second sample was a follow-up sample for the 1992 sample. All respondents to the 1992
survey that could be located were included. A few maquiladoras were included in the 1995
survey through this follow-up sample.
67The convention in the EIA for plants producing under subcontract is to report earnings from subcon-
tracting as income from subcontracting services (ingresos por servicios de maquila), not under value of
production or sales. For plants subcontracting out, payments to subcontractors are classiﬁed under costs,
and sales of the subcontracted goods are reported under total value of production and sales.
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The surveys were designed as separate cross-sections, not as a panel, but because of the
fact that large establishments are sampled with certainty, it is possible to link a fair number
of plants over time. The diﬀerent waves of the survey did not employ the same identiﬁcation
codes, and many of the establishments had to be linked across years by establishment name
and street address. Although many questions changed in the questionnaires between waves,
several key variables are comparable across waves.
My judgment after working extensively with these data is that the EIA is the more
reliable source because plants are followed more closely by INEGI personnel. For this reason,
I focus on plants that appear in both the ENESTyC and the EIA, and use information (i.e.
on domestic sales) from the EIA when possible. To construct the EIA-ENESTyC Panel, I
limited the sample to plants in the balanced EIA 1993-2001 Panel that could be linked to
the ENESTyC and had non-missing data for ISO 9000 certiﬁcation — the most important
ENESTyC variable for testing the quality-upgrading hypothesis — in the three waves in
which ISO 9000 is available: 1995, 1999, and 2001. This yielded a panel of 844 plants.
Limiting the panel to plants with complete data on all variables included in Table 4 would
have made the panel prohibitively small. Instead, I allow the sample size to change when
focusing on the diﬀerent dependent variables in Table 4.
The ENESTyC asked a number of diﬀerent questions about employee training. It ap-
pears from the pattern of responses, however, that respondents misunderstood many of the
speciﬁc questions, or used diﬀerent rules of thumb to guide their answers. The most reliable
measure of training appears to be simply whether or not a formal training program exists
at the plant, rather than how many workers received training.
The ENESTyC reports wage and employment data by 4 occupational categories: un-
skilled blue-collar workers, skilled blue-collar workers, administrative and technical workers,
and managers. The deﬁnitions of the categories in the oﬃcial documentation, however, are
imprecise, especially on the distinction between unskilled and skilled blue-collar workers,
and this seems to have led to a signiﬁcant amount of noise in the data, with some plants
reporting all their blue-collar workers under the skilled blue-collar category, and others
under the unskilled blue-collar category. The coarser distinction between blue-collar and
white-collar workers is more familiar to survey respondents and appears to be more reliable.
The information on white-collar and blue-collar schooling is available only in the 1992,
1999 and 2001 waves. I used information from the 1992 wave rather than the 1995 wave as
the pre-peso-crisis information.
I censored outliers for the turnover rate, the accident rate, and the absentee rate follow-
ing the same procedure as for the EIA, assigning all variables in the bottom and top 1% to
the values at the 1st and 99th percentiles respectively.
The variables used from the EIA-ENESTyC panel were deﬁned as follows:
ISO 9000 indicator = 1 if the establishment has ISO 9000 or similar quality certiﬁcation,
= 0 otherwise.
Average schooling of blue-collar workers = (3*(# with less than primary school) + 6*(#
with primary school) + 9*(# with junior high school) + 12*(# with high school) +
16*(# with college/professional degree) + 18*(# with postgraduate education))/employment
of blue-collar workers at time of survey
Average schooling of white-collar workers: similar to blue-collar average schooling.
Formal training indicator = 1 if establishment reports that is has a formal training pro-
gram, = 0 otherwise.
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Turnover rate = 100*(2*(separations + new hires over previous 6 months))/total employ-
ment at time of survey.
Accident rate = 100*(number of accidents over previous calendar year)/average employ-
ment for previous calendar year.
Absentee rate = average number of daily absences/employment at time of survey.
B.3 Estad´ısticas Mensuales de la Industria Maquiladora de Exportacio´n
(EMIME)
In order to remain in the Mexican government export-promotion program, maquiladora
plants must report monthly production statistics. These administrative records are col-
lected in a dataﬁle referred to by INEGI as the Estad´ısticas Mensuales de la Industria
Maquiladora de Exportacio´n (EMIME) [Monthly Statistics on Maquiladora Export Indus-
try], which represents a census of participants in the program each month. The EMIME
contains information on employment and wages by occupational categories and spending on
inputs. Hours worked by occupational category is available beginning in 1997. The EMIME
does not contain a measure of total sales, nor does it include measures of the share of in-
puts that are imported or the share of output that is exported. The industrial classiﬁcation
used by the EMIME is grupo econo´mico [economic group], of which there are 12.68 Data
are available from 1990-2004. To maximize comparability with the EIA 1993-2001 Panel, I
draw the set of plants with complete data in every year over the 1993-2001 period. I refer
to these 1,088 plants as the EMIME panel.
The variables used from the EIA-ENESTyC panel were deﬁned as follows:
Average hourly wage = total wage bill (all workers)/total hours. Note that hours by
occupation are not available prior to 1997.
Blue-collar yearly earnings = total blue-collar (obrero) wage bill/average blue-collar em-
ployment over 12 months, deﬂated to 1994 pesos by consumer price index.
White-collar yearly earnings = total white-collar (empleados + te´cnicos) wage bill/average
white-collar employment over 12 months, deﬂated to 1994 pesos by consumer price
index.
B.4 Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano (ENEU)
The Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano (ENEU) [National Urban Employment Survey] is
a household survey modeled on the Current Population Survey (CPS) in the U.S. Households
are interviewed quarterly for ﬁve quarters, and then rotate out of the sample. The original
ENEU sample focused on the 16 largest Mexican cities.69 Over time, the coverage of cities
68The 12 groups are: 1. Selection, preparation, packaging and canning of food; 2. Assembly of apparel and
other textile products; 3. Shoes and leather goods; 4. Furniture and accessories and other metal and wood
products; 5. Chemical products; 6. Construction, reconstruction and assembly of transportation equipment
and accessories; 7. Assembly and repair of tools and machinery (not electric); 8. Assembly and repair of
machinery (electric and electronic); 9. Materials and accessories (electric and electronic); 10. Assembly of
toys and sporting goods; 11. Other manufacturing; 12. Services.
69The 16 cities are: Mexico City, Guadalajara, Monterrey, Puebla, Leon, Torreon, San Luis Potosi, Merida,
Chihuahua, Tampico, Orizaba, Veracruz, Ciudad Juarez, Tijuana, Matamoros and Nuevo Laredo.
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expanded but I focus on the original 16 cities in order to maximize comparability across
years.70
The ENEU sample used in this paper consists of men, ages 16-64, who worked 35 or
more hours in previous week, in 16 cities in original (1987) ENEU sample.71 Self-employed
workers are excluded.
The hourly wage ﬁgures were constructed as follows:
1. I recovered monthly wages for the job worked last week as converted from weekly or
bi-weekly basis by INEGI enumerators. Top-coded reports were assigned 1.5 times the
top-code value. Individuals who reported not working in previous week were dropped.
2. Monthly hours were calculated as 4.3 times hours worked in the previous week. Re-
sponses of “irregular hours, less than 35”, “irregular hours, between 35 and 48” and
“irregular hours, more than 48” were assigned values of 20, 42 and 60 hours per week,
respectively.
3. Hourly wage was calculated as monthly wage/monthly hours. The wage was deﬂated
to constant 1994 pesos using the main consumer price index (INPC) from Banco de
Mexico, the Mexican central bank.
4. I winsorized the wage data at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
Average schooling by 4-digit industry (Figure 2) is calculated as an average of years of
schooling of workers in industry. All calculations for wages and average schooling use the
sampling weights reported by INEGI.
B.5 Administrative Records of the Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social
(IMSS)
All private, formal-sector Mexican employers are required to report wages for their em-
ployees, and pay social-security taxes on the basis of their reports to the Mexican social
security agency, Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social (IMSS). The raw data can be consid-
ered a census of private, formal-sector establishments and their workforces for 1985-2001.
The number of workers in the raw data at a given point in time ranges from approximately
5 million in 1985 to approximately 11 million in 2001. These data are the basis for Kaplan
and Verhoogen (2006), and readers are referred there for further details. To mimic the EIA
sample, we drew balanced panels of plants with 50 or more workers in all years 1993-2001 in
two broad sectors, tradables (manufacturing) and non-tradables (construction, retail trade,
transportation, and services). The panels have 3628 and 3672 establishments respectively.
The IMSS data contain information on the daily wage of individuals. The ﬁgures are
based on a measure of total compensation, called the salario base de cotizacio´n, which
includes both wages and beneﬁts, including payments made in cash, bonuses, commissions,
room and board, overtime payments, and in-kind beneﬁts. We extracted data for September
70Mexico also had a nationally representative survey that covered rural areas, the Encuesta Nacional de
Empleo (ENE), but until it was combined with the ENEU in 2000 it was carried out at less regular intervals.
71The processing of the ENEU data in Figure 1b of Robertson (2004) diﬀers from this sample in that it
includes women and 8 of the original 16 cities. These diﬀerences do not explain the discrepancy between
that ﬁgure and Figure 1 of this paper, and I have not been able to replicate his ﬁgure to determine the
source of the discrepancy.
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30 for each year. At the establishment level, the data contain information only on location
and industry (using the IMSS’s own 4-digit industrial categories).
The wage variable used in Appendix Table 3 is an average over all individuals in a given
plant of the log real daily wage on Sept. 30 of the given year.
B.6 Alternative Proxies
The alternative proxy variables used in Table 5 were constructed as follows:
Predicted export share index: I ran a tobit of the export share of sales on log hours worked
for each occupation, log total sales, log capital-labor ratio, log electricity intensity
(kilowatt hours used per hour worked), an indicator for whether the plant has ≥ 10%
foreign ownership, and 4-digit industry eﬀects. I then recovered the predicted values
x′βˆ, deviated from 6-digit industry means, and standardized the variable to have
variance 1.
Predicted ISO 9000 index: Using the EIA-ENESTyC panel, I ran a probit of ISO 9000
certiﬁcation on the same covariates as for the export share index plus the export share
itself. With the estimate of βˆ from this probit, I calculated x′βˆ for all plants in the
EIA 1993-2001 Panel, then deviated from 6-digit industry means and standardized to
have variance 1.
First principal component: I deviated the co-variates used for the ISO 9000 index from
6-digit industry means, took the ﬁrst principal component (the linear combination
capturing the maximum variance of the joint distribution of the variables), and stan-
dardized the variable to have variance 1.
Total factor productivity (TFP): I pooled data for two years (i.e. 1993 and 1994, or 1997
and 1998) and regressed log revenues on log hours worked for each occupation, log
capital-labor ratio, log materials costs, log electricity costs, and plant ﬁxed eﬀects.
I recovered the coeﬃcients on the plant ﬁxed eﬀects, deviated them from 6-digit
industry means, and standardized.72 Note that this approach to estimating TFP is
attractive because, unlike other standard TFP measures, it does not mechanically
include year-speciﬁc measurement error in revenues.73
Domestic sales per worker = total real domestic sales/average employment for year.
Since wages are the primary outcome variables of interest, they are omitted from the con-
struction of these proxies, so that mean reversion in wages due to measurement error does
not bias the estimates. An FDI indicator is included; although this variable does not enter
into the theoretical model, it seems plausible that foreign-owned plants have greater ac-
cess to the knowledge and technologies of their parent companies, and hence that foreign
ownership is a predictor for unobserved know-how or productivity.
72I am indebted to Matthias Schuendeln for suggesting this approach.
73It is important to note that standard methods for estimating TFP impose assumptions on the production
function and market structure that are inconsistent with the model presented in this paper. I include the
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Summary Statistics by Export Status
A. EIA 1993-2001 Panel, 1993 Non-exporters Exporters All
employment 182.39 333.76 226.32
(4.94) (11.98) (5.08)
revenues 42.24 89.84 56.05
(1.75) (4.59) (1.86)
domestic sales 41.17 70.16 49.58
(1.71) (3.59) (1.61)
K/L ratio 42.58 55.59 46.36
(1.40) (2.60) (1.25)
white-collar hourly wage 20.53 28.40 22.81
(0.27) (0.50) (0.25)
blue-collar hourly wage 8.04 9.64 8.50
(0.08) (0.15) (0.07)
white-collar employment share 0.30 0.33 0.31
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
export share of sales 0.16
(0.01)
share with foreign ownership 0.09 0.30 0.15
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
N 2316 747 3263
B. EIA-ENESTyC Panel Non-exporters Exporters All
employment 308.37 414.29 348.91
(12.18) (21.08) (11.16)
share with ISO 9000 certification 0.09 0.12 0.10
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
share with formal training program 0.69 0.79 0.73
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
avg. schooling, white-collar 12.04 12.47 12.20
(0.08) (0.10) (0.06)
avg. schooling, blue-collar 7.26 7.38 7.30
(0.07) (0.09) (0.05)
absentee rate 1.41 1.20 1.33
(0.07) (0.08) (0.05)
turnover rate 74.70 66.62 71.56
(3.66) (4.44) (2.83)
accident rate 5.01 4.63 4.87
(0.29) (0.31) (0.21)
Notes: Standard errors of means in parentheses. Exporter means export sales > 0. Has foreign ownership means FDI share > 0. Data on 
FDI from 1994; other data from EIA Balanced panel from 1993. Revenues, domestic sales measured in millions of 1994 pesos, K/L r atio in 
thousands of 1994 pesos, wages in 1994 pesos per hour, employment in number of workers, employment share in hours. Data on ISO 9000, 
training, accidents from ENESTyC 1995, reporting for 1994; data on schooling from ENESTyC 1992, reporting for 1991. Numbers of 
observations for non-exporters (exporters) are 521 (323) for employment and ISO 9000, 366 (224) for white-collar schooling, 367  (223) for 
blue-collar schooling, 510 (318) for accident rate, 317 (198) for absentee rate, 459 (292) for turnover rate; otherwise as repo rted above. 
Variable definitions and further details on datasets in Appendix B.
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i
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c
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p
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.
8
1
0
.
6
4
0
.
6
6
0
.
4
0
0
.
7
4
1
.
0
0
l
o
g
 
(
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
 
s
a
l
e
s
 
p
e
r
 
w
o
r
k
e
r
)
0
.
6
5
0
.
0
6
0
.
2
5
0
.
1
2
0
.
3
6
0
.
5
4
1
.
0
0
e
x
p
o
r
t
 
s
h
a
r
e
 
 
0
.
1
9
0
.
2
3
0
.
2
9
0
.
3
2
0
.
1
1
1
.
0
0
N
o
t
e
s
:
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
s
 
b
i
v
a
r
i
a
t
e
 
c
o
r
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
c
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
s
 
f
o
r
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
d
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
i
n
 
1
9
9
3
.
 
A
l
l
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
h
a
v
e
 
b
e
e
n
 
d
e
v
i
a
t
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
m
e
a
n
s
.
 
C
o
r
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
a
c
t
u
a
l
 
e
x
p
o
r
t
 
s
h
a
r
e
 
a
n
d
 
l
o
g
 
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
 
s
a
l
e
s
,
 
l
o
g
 
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
 
s
a
l
e
s
 
p
e
r
 
w
o
r
k
e
r
 
o
m
i
t
t
e
d
 
b
e
c
a
u
s
e
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
m
e
n
t
 
e
r
r
o
r
 
i
n
 
s
a
l
e
s
 
g
e
n
e
r
a
t
e
s
 
s
e
v
e
r
e
 
a
n
d
 
m
i
s
l
e
a
d
i
n
g
 
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
 
b
i
a
s
;
 
s
e
e
 
d
i
s
c
u
s
s
i
o
n
 
i
n
 
S
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
5
.
 
N
=
3
2
6
3
.
 
D
e
f
i
n
i
t
i
o
n
s
 
o
f
 
p
r
o
x
i
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
f
u
r
t
h
e
r
 
d
e
t
a
i
l
s
 
o
n
 
d
a
t
a
s
e
t
 
i
n
 
A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x
 
B
.
l
o
g
 
(
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
 
s
a
l
e
s
)
l
o
g
 
(
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
)
e
x
p
o
r
t
 
s
h
a
r
e
 
i
n
d
e
x
e
x
p
o
r
t
 
s
h
a
r
e
I
S
O
 
9
0
0
0
 
i
n
d
e
x
1
s
t
 
p
r
i
n
.
 
c
o
m
p
o
n
e
n
t
l
o
g
 
(
d
o
m
 
s
a
l
e
s
/
w
o
r
k
e
r
)
T
F
P
 
(
f
i
x
e
d
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
)
A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
2
S
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
-
C
o
r
r
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
M
o
d
e
l
,
 
E
I
A
 
1
9
9
3
-
2
0
0
1
 
U
n
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
d
 
P
a
n
e
l
(
1
)
(
2
)
(
3
)
(
4
)
(
5
)
(
6
)
(
7
)
1
9
9
3
-
1
9
9
7
l
o
g
 
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
 
s
a
l
e
s
,
 
1
9
9
3
0
.
3
3
1
*
*
*
0
.
0
1
3
*
*
*
0
.
0
5
0
*
*
*
0
.
0
3
4
*
*
*
0
.
0
1
3
0
.
0
6
1
*
*
*
0
.
0
0
4
[
0
.
0
2
5
]
[
0
.
0
0
4
]
[
0
.
0
1
5
]
[
0
.
0
1
0
]
[
0
.
0
1
7
]
[
0
.
0
2
0
]
[
0
.
0
0
3
]
1
9
9
7
-
2
0
0
1
l
o
g
 
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
 
s
a
l
e
s
,
 
1
9
9
7
0
.
3
5
7
*
*
*
0
.
0
0
5
*
0
.
0
1
0
-
0
.
0
0
1
0
.
0
1
4
0
.
0
2
2
0
.
0
0
3
[
0
.
0
2
8
]
[
0
.
0
0
3
]
[
0
.
0
1
0
]
[
0
.
0
0
8
]
[
0
.
0
1
2
]
[
0
.
0
1
4
]
[
0
.
0
0
2
]
D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
i
n
 
c
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
s
0
.
0
0
8
0
.
0
4
0
*
*
0
.
0
3
5
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
1
0
.
0
3
9
*
0
.
0
0
1
[
0
.
0
0
5
]
[
0
.
0
1
8
]
[
0
.
0
1
3
]
[
0
.
0
2
1
]
[
0
.
0
2
4
]
[
0
.
0
0
4
]
s
u
r
v
i
v
e
 
t
o
 
e
n
d
 
o
f
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
N
o
t
e
s
:
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
s
 
c
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
s
 
o
n
 
l
o
g
 
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
 
s
a
l
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
1
2
 
s
e
p
a
r
a
t
e
 
t
w
o
-
s
t
e
p
 
s
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
-
c
o
r
r
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
m
o
d
e
l
s
,
 
w
i
t
h
o
u
t
 
i
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
s
 
(
H
e
c
k
m
a
n
,
 
1
9
7
6
)
.
 
(
C
o
-
v
a
r
i
a
t
e
 
a
t
 
l
e
f
t
;
 
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
a
t
 
t
o
p
,
 
w
i
t
h
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
 
i
n
 
C
o
l
u
m
n
s
 
2
-
7
 
o
v
e
r
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
 
a
t
 
l
e
f
t
.
)
 
C
o
l
u
m
n
 
1
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
s
 
f
i
r
s
t
 
s
t
a
g
e
,
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
i
s
 
c
o
m
m
o
n
 
t
o
 
s
e
c
o
n
d
-
s
t
a
g
e
s
 
i
n
 
C
o
l
u
m
n
s
 
2
-
7
.
 
A
l
l
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
 
2
0
5
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
(
6
-
d
i
g
i
t
)
 
a
n
d
 
3
2
 
s
t
a
t
e
 
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
.
N
=
4
4
0
2
 
i
n
 
1
9
9
3
,
 
o
f
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
3
6
8
2
 
s
u
r
v
i
v
e
 
u
n
t
i
l
 
1
9
9
7
.
 
N
=
3
6
8
2
 
i
n
 
1
9
9
7
,
 
o
f
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
3
2
6
3
 
s
u
r
v
i
v
e
 
u
n
t
i
l
 
2
0
0
1
.
 
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
d
e
f
i
n
i
t
i
o
n
s
 
a
n
d
 
f
u
r
t
h
e
r
 
d
e
t
a
i
l
s
 
o
n
 
d
a
t
a
s
e
t
 
i
n
 
A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x
 
B
.
 
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
e
r
r
o
r
s
 
i
n
 
b
r
a
c
k
e
t
s
.
 
*
*
*
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
s
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
c
e
 
a
t
 
1
%
 
l
e
v
e
l
,
 
*
*
 
a
t
 
5
%
 
l
e
v
e
l
,
 
*
 
a
t
 
1
0
%
 
l
e
v
e
l
.
 
∆ (
e
x
p
o
r
t
 
s
h
a
r
e
 
o
f
 
s
a
l
e
s
)
∆ w
h
i
t
e
-
c
o
l
l
.
 
e
m
p
.
 
s
h
a
r
e
 
∆ l
o
g
(
K
/
L
 
r
a
t
i
o
)
∆ l
o
g
(
w
h
i
t
e
-
c
o
l
l
a
r
 
w
a
g
e
)
∆ l
o
g
(
w
a
g
e
 
r
a
t
i
o
)
∆ l
o
g
(
b
l
u
e
-
c
o
l
l
a
r
 
w
a
g
e
)
A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
3
C
o
m
p
a
r
i
n
g
 
M
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
 
a
n
d
 
N
o
n
-
T
r
a
d
a
b
l
e
 
S
e
c
t
o
r
s
,
 
D
a
t
a
 
f
r
o
m
 
S
o
c
i
a
l
 
S
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
 
R
e
c
o
r
d
s
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
:
∆ l
o
g
(
h
o
u
r
l
y
 
w
a
g
e
)
D
a
t
a
s
e
t
:
(
1
)
(
2
)
(
3
)
(
4
)
1
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3
-
1
9
9
7
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o
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e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
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9
9
3
0
.
0
7
2
*
*
*
0
.
0
5
6
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*
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.
0
1
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*
*
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0
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0
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1
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*
*
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0
0
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0
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]
[
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0
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.
0
0
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R
-
s
q
u
a
r
e
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0
.
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0
.
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1
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7
-
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0
1
l
o
g
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
1
9
9
7
0
.
0
2
5
*
*
*
0
.
0
2
2
*
*
*
-
0
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0
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0
.
0
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3
*
*
*
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0
0
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]
[
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0
0
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]
[
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0
6
]
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0
0
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]
R
-
s
q
u
a
r
e
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0
.
1
0
9
0
.
1
1
7
0
.
0
8
7
D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
(
1
9
9
3
-
1
9
9
7
 
v
s
.
 
1
9
9
7
-
2
0
0
1
)
0
.
0
4
7
*
*
*
0
.
0
3
4
*
*
*
0
.
0
1
5
*
*
0
.
0
1
8
*
*
[
0
.
0
0
9
]
[
0
.
0
0
6
]
[
0
.
0
0
8
]
[
0
.
0
0
9
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N
3
2
6
3
3
6
2
8
3
6
7
2
N
o
t
e
s
:
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
s
 
c
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
s
 
o
n
 
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
 
l
o
g
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
f
o
r
 
6
 
s
e
p
a
r
a
t
e
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
.
 
(
C
o
-
v
a
r
i
a
t
e
 
a
t
 
l
e
f
t
;
 
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
a
t
 
t
o
p
,
 
w
i
t
h
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
 
o
v
e
r
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
 
a
t
 
l
e
f
t
.
)
 
C
o
l
u
m
n
 
(
1
)
 
u
s
e
s
 
t
h
e
 
E
I
A
 
1
9
9
3
-
2
0
0
1
 
p
a
n
e
l
 
a
n
d
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
s
 
2
0
5
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
(
6
-
d
i
g
i
t
)
 
a
n
d
 
3
2
 
s
t
a
t
e
 
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
.
 
T
h
e
 
w
a
g
e
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
i
s
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
r
e
a
l
 
h
o
u
r
l
y
 
w
a
g
e
 
f
o
r
 
w
h
i
t
e
-
 
a
n
d
 
b
l
u
e
-
c
o
l
l
a
r
 
w
o
r
k
e
r
s
 
t
o
g
e
t
h
e
r
 
(
t
o
t
a
l
 
w
a
g
e
 
b
i
l
l
/
t
o
t
a
l
 
h
o
u
r
s
 
w
o
r
k
e
d
)
.
 
C
o
l
u
m
n
s
 
(
2
)
 
a
n
d
 
(
3
)
 
u
s
e
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
d
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
-
l
e
v
e
l
 
p
a
n
e
l
s
 
f
o
r
 
1
9
9
3
-
2
0
0
1
 
f
r
o
m
 
a
d
m
i
n
i
s
t
r
a
t
i
v
e
 
e
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
 
r
e
c
o
r
d
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
I
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
o
 
M
e
x
i
c
a
n
o
 
d
e
l
 
S
e
g
u
r
o
 
S
o
c
i
a
l
 
(
I
M
S
S
)
,
 
t
h
e
 
M
e
x
i
c
a
n
 
s
o
c
i
a
l
 
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
 
a
g
e
n
c
y
,
 
a
n
d
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
 
1
2
2
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
 
(
u
s
i
n
g
 
a
n
 
I
M
S
S
-
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
i
a
l
 
c
l
a
s
s
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
)
 
a
n
d
 
3
2
 
s
t
a
t
e
 
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
.
 
W
a
g
e
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
i
s
 
a
n
 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
o
v
e
r
 
a
l
l
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
e
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
l
o
g
 
r
e
a
l
 
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
 
d
a
i
l
y
 
w
a
g
e
 
f
o
r
 
p
e
r
m
a
n
e
n
t
 
(
n
o
n
-
c
a
s
u
a
l
)
 
w
o
r
k
e
r
s
 
o
n
 
S
e
p
t
.
 
3
0
 
o
f
 
e
a
c
h
 
y
e
a
r
.
 
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
e
r
r
o
r
 
o
n
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
s
 
i
n
 
c
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
s
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
1
9
9
3
-
1
9
9
7
 
a
n
d
 
1
9
9
7
-
2
0
0
1
 
a
l
l
o
w
 
f
o
r
 
c
r
o
s
s
-
e
q
u
a
t
i
o
n
 
c
o
r
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
.
 
F
u
r
t
h
e
r
 
d
e
t
a
i
l
s
 
o
n
 
d
a
t
a
s
e
t
s
 
i
n
 
A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x
 
B
.
 
R
o
b
u
s
t
 
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
e
r
r
o
r
s
 
i
n
 
b
r
a
c
k
e
t
s
.
 
*
*
*
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
s
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
c
e
 
a
t
 
1
%
 
l
e
v
e
l
,
 
*
*
 
a
t
 
5
%
 
l
e
v
e
l
,
 
*
 
a
t
 
1
0
%
 
l
e
v
e
l
.
D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(
I
M
S
S
 
M
f
g
.
 
v
s
.
 
I
M
S
S
 
S
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
)
E
I
A
 
1
9
9
3
-
2
0
0
1
 
P
a
n
e
l
 
(
M
f
g
.
)
I
M
S
S
 
M
f
g
.
 
P
a
n
e
l
I
M
S
S
 
S
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
 
P
a
n
e
l
∆ l
o
g
(
d
a
i
l
y
 
w
a
g
e
)
A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
4
C
l
e
a
n
i
n
g
 
P
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
e
 
f
o
r
 
E
I
A
 
1
9
9
3
-
2
0
0
1
 
P
a
n
e
l
N
o
n
-
e
x
i
t
e
r
s
A
l
l
N
o
n
-
r
a
n
d
o
m
R
a
n
d
o
m
R
a
w
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
 
(
#
 
o
f
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
)
4
8
3
1
1
9
0
2
4
2
4
7
1
5
7
S
u
b
t
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
s
-
4
1
8
-
1
8
6
-
8
5
-
6
8
9
-
2
3
0
-
2
1
-
6
-
2
5
7
-
3
9
-
2
2
0
-
6
1
-
3
7
4
-
2
7
8
-
5
1
-
7
0
3
0
0
-
2
8
2
-
2
8
2
-
5
0
7
-
2
5
6
0
-
7
6
3
S
a
m
p
l
e
 
a
f
t
e
r
 
c
l
e
a
n
i
n
g
3
2
6
3
1
1
3
9
0
4
4
0
2
N
o
t
e
s
:
 
P
l
a
n
t
s
 
a
r
e
 
a
s
s
u
m
e
d
 
t
o
 
b
e
 
m
a
q
u
i
l
a
s
 
e
i
t
h
e
r
 
i
f
 
e
x
p
o
r
t
s
 
m
a
k
e
 
u
p
 
9
5
%
 
o
r
 
m
o
r
e
 
o
f
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
s
a
l
e
s
,
 
o
r
 
i
f
 
s
u
b
c
o
n
t
r
a
t
i
n
g
 
i
n
c
o
m
e
 
m
a
k
e
s
 
u
p
 
9
5
%
 
o
r
 
m
o
r
e
 
o
f
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
r
e
v
e
n
u
e
s
.
 
N
o
n
-
r
a
n
d
o
m
 
e
x
i
t
e
r
s
 
d
e
f
i
n
e
d
 
a
s
 
p
l
a
n
t
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
g
o
 
b
a
n
k
r
u
p
t
 
o
r
 
t
h
a
t
 
s
u
s
p
e
n
d
 
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
s
,
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
i
n
g
 
s
u
s
p
e
n
s
i
o
n
s
 
d
u
e
 
t
o
 
l
a
c
k
 
o
f
 
m
a
t
e
r
i
a
l
s
 
o
r
 
s
t
r
i
k
e
s
.
 
R
a
n
d
o
m
 
e
x
i
t
e
r
s
 
a
r
e
 
d
e
f
i
n
e
d
 
a
s
 
p
l
a
n
t
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
s
w
i
t
c
h
 
t
o
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
i
e
s
 
n
o
t
 
c
o
v
e
r
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
s
u
r
v
e
y
,
 
t
h
a
t
 
s
w
i
t
c
h
 
f
r
o
m
 
m
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
 
t
o
 
p
r
i
m
a
r
i
l
y
 
w
h
o
l
e
s
a
l
e
 
o
r
 
r
e
t
a
i
l
 
s
a
l
e
s
,
 
t
h
a
t
 
m
e
r
g
e
 
w
i
t
h
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
,
 
o
r
 
t
h
a
t
 
f
a
i
l
 
t
o
 
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
 
d
a
t
a
 
f
o
r
 
u
n
e
x
p
l
a
i
n
e
d
 
r
e
a
s
o
n
s
.
 
R
a
n
d
o
m
 
e
x
i
t
e
r
s
 
a
r
e
 
a
s
s
u
m
e
d
 
t
o
 
b
e
 
i
g
n
o
r
a
b
l
e
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
s
e
n
s
e
 
o
f
 
G
r
i
l
i
c
h
e
s
 
(
1
9
8
6
)
.
 
T
h
e
 
E
I
A
 
1
9
9
3
-
2
0
0
1
 
p
a
n
e
l
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
s
 
n
o
n
-
e
x
i
t
e
r
s
 
o
n
l
y
.
 
T
h
e
 
E
I
A
 
1
9
9
3
-
2
0
0
1
 
u
n
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
d
 
p
a
n
e
l
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
s
 
n
o
n
-
e
x
i
t
e
r
s
 
a
n
d
 
n
o
n
-
r
a
n
d
o
m
 
e
x
i
t
e
r
s
.
 
F
u
r
t
h
e
r
 
d
e
t
a
i
l
s
 
o
n
 
d
a
t
a
s
e
t
 
i
n
 
A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x
 
B
.
4
.
 
R
e
m
o
v
e
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
a
p
p
e
a
r
 
t
o
 
b
e
 
m
a
q
u
i
l
a
s
.
6
.
 
R
e
m
o
v
e
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
i
n
c
o
m
p
l
e
t
e
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
(
a
f
t
e
r
 
i
m
p
u
t
a
t
i
o
n
 
p
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
e
 
d
e
s
c
r
i
b
e
d
 
i
n
 
A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x
 
B
)
.
1
.
 
R
e
m
o
v
e
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
 
w
h
o
s
e
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
s
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
 
i
n
 
a
n
o
t
h
e
r
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
s
a
m
e
 
f
i
r
m
.
2
.
 
R
e
m
o
v
e
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
f
r
o
m
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
s
a
m
e
 
f
i
r
m
.
3
.
 
R
e
m
o
v
e
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
 
o
w
n
e
d
 
i
n
 
w
h
o
l
e
 
o
r
 
i
n
 
p
a
r
t
 
b
y
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
.
E
x
i
t
e
r
s
5
.
 
R
e
m
o
v
e
 
p
l
a
n
t
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
e
x
i
t
 
r
a
n
d
o
m
l
y
.
